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

Professor Sydney Anglo

The Courtier's Art. Systematic Immorality in the Renaissance

UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF SWANSEA

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

UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF SWANSEA

THE COURTIER'S ART

SYSTEMATIC IMMORALITY IN THE RENAISSANCE

an Inaugural Lecture

delivered at the University College of Swansea

20 January, 1983

by

PROFESSOR SYDNEY ANGLO

B.A., Ph.D. (London), F.S.A., F.R.Hist.S.

Professor in the History of Ideas

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

In 1611, amidst a pamphlet war provoked by the Oath of Allegiance imposed upon the Roman Catholic community in England, John Donne published his satire, Ignatius his Conclave. Here, in an ecstasy, the author's soul wanders through Hell, eventually coming upon a secret place where Lucifer, accompanied only by a select band of great and evil innovators, is enthroned. 'Once in an age', the gates of this inner sanctum are opened; and all contenders for admission come forward to plead their cause.[1] Donne's soul has arrived at the opportune moment; and he recognises the first candidate as Copernicus who does very well and impresses Lucifer, until the founder of the Jesuits, Ignatius Loyola, who is already firmly ensconced, destroys this new rival's arguments. One after another, claimants press their case; and each, in turn, is out-argued by Loyola. The only serious contestant is Niccolò Machiavelli: but he, too, is thwarted by jesuitical cunning. It is not that Machiavelli has not caused harmful innovations. His weakness is that everybody has 'risen up against him, and no man attempted to defend him'. Thus his doctrine is the 'less artificially carried, and the less able to work those ends to which it is directed'. 'This then', cries Ignatius, 'is the point of which we accuse Machiavel, that he carried not his mine so safely, but that the enemy perceived it still'. And so Donne sees 'Machiavel often put forward, and often thrust back, and at last vanish'.[2]

I have been wondering what might happen should Baldassare Castiglione present himself as a candidate for admission to Lucifer's inner sanctum: basing his case upon the Libro del Cortegiano and its reception in Europe. How might Loyola attack his pretensions; and how might Castiglione answer the cross-examination? This evening, to inaugurate my own admission into some sort of inner sanctum (though I'll not press the analogy further), I thought that it would be profitable to pursue this fantasy. Let us, therefore, consider how Castiglione might fare in the face of Loyola's assured hostility. How sucessfully could Castiglione claim that his courtier was an innovation? That, if indeed an innovation, it had been of major importance? And finally, that such innovation had produced the requisite harmful results?

So, enter Baldassare Castiglione: arousing interest amongst those who recognise his hat, beard, and collar from Raphael's portrait of them in the Louvre. He addresses Lucifer in a 'good voice, not too subtle or soft; nor yet boisterous and rough', but 'clear and sweet, with a prompt pronunciation; and with fit gestures: tempered with a mannerly countenance, and with a moving of the eyes that gives grace and accord with the words'.[3] Castiglione, a keen student of rhetorical effect, has observed the way in which his predecessors had argued their case too fully from the outset, leaving the way clear for Ignatius to refute them point by point. Accordingly, with studied nonchalance, he merely suggests that he might have some modest claim to be considered as an innovator. Prior to the publication of Il Cortegiano, nothing like his perfect courtier had existed; while, subsequent to its appearance, courtiership had never been the same again.[4]

The life of elegant ease, social success, and dazzling popularity opened up for the expert exponent of Castiglione's ideas naturally attracts Lucifer who, due to an unfortunate display of overweening pride, had himself been cast out of the highest of all possible courts. But Loyola, jealous of the slightest fluctuation in

his prince's favour, hastily intervenes to challenge both the originality of Castiglione's conception and its alleged significance.

In the first place: what is the Libro del Cortegiano but an elegant amalgam of mediaeval and Renaissance commonplaces? It is not even a properly structured account of the perfect courtier. It is simply, under the specious guise of reported conversation, a collection of miniature treatises - each in itself quite inadequate and unoriginal - on a variety of stale debating topics. It discusses the nature of true nobility: but this was a theme already hackneyed among ancient authors; while Castiglione's inclination to favour nobility of birth, rather than that of virtue and ability, could be regarded as distinctly old-fashioned. His advocacy of a wide-ranging education balancing intellectual pursuits with physical exercise, and its extension into the universal man of manifold expertise, was itself obviously a repetition of educational ideals widely popularised in the fifteenth century by theorists such as Vergerio, Vittorino da Feltre, and Aeneas Sylvius Piccolomini. Castiglione's examination of eloquence and literary language is only a summary of a mass of Renaissance critical theory which might easily be consulted elsewhere; his interest in developing the potentialities of the vernacular was a conventional posture; while his treatment of jokes was but a pallid copy of Cicero's similar discussion in the De oratore and, moreover, markedly inferior to Pontano's De sermone. [5]

The debate concerning Arms and Letters was even more derivative. There was scarcely a humanist worth his salt who had not pronounced on the relative merits of book-learning and martial prowess, and who had not concluded - like Castiglione - that it is best to combine both. And what of the last and most striking irrelevance in Il Cortegiano: the oration on the contemplation of beauty leading to an ecstatic vision of Divine Love? This takes as its starting point a combination of three favourite themes: whether old men could properly be lovers; whether sight is the noblest of the senses; and, indeed, whether beauty (and therefore love) could ever be conceived without vision. This kind of thing was already to be found in Andreas Capellanus's Tractatus de amore in the twelfth century; was not new even then; and had been repeated ad nauseam in debates on courtly love ever since. The whole artificial nonsense had been philosophised and elevated to the empyrean of the absurd by Neoplatonists such as Ficino; vulgarised by Bembo; and thereafter by Castiglione. Thus Castiglione is nothing better than a vulgariser of vulgarisations.

Even his famous sprezzatura - that studied nonchalance; that carefully-concealed premeditation; that art which conceals art - has its own rhetorical antecedents. The simulated spontaneity of Il Cortegiano is patently derived from that cultivated eloquence advocated by Quintilian who, fifteen hundred years before Castiglione, had already recognised that the line between calculated naturalness and affectation was a very faint one.[6] Rhetoric could always degenerate into extravagance; and, in the Renaissance, there were even preachers who affected such natural gestures as coughs, 'for something which added Grace and Gravity to their discourse': men such as the famous Olivier Maillard who 'marked the places and paragraphs of his discourse with a "hem, hem, hem" where he had a design to cough upon it'. [7] This practice was subsequently satirised by Rabelais who wrote a whole paroxysm of coughs and splutters into the oration of the idiot sophist, Janotus de Bragmardo:

> 'Hem, hem, gud-day, sirs, gud-day. Et vobis, my masters.
> It were but reason that you should restore to us our bells;
> for we have great need of them. Hem, hem, aihfuhash ...
> Hem, hem, hem haikhash ... Hem, hashchehhawksash,
> qzrchremhemhash'.

(I am, as you will doubtless have remarked, quoting these coughs in Urquhart's English translation). [8]

A second objection to Castiglione's Cortegiano is this: if it really were so revolutionary, why had traditional views of the courtier never changed? Writers throughout the Middle Ages had inveighed against court life. Courts were centres for every kind of vice; and those who resided there were inevitably vice-ridden. The only way in which men could succeed at court was by unashamed flattery, guile, deceit, and moral corruption. Rewards were, at best, merely transitory; and, in the end, courtiers were paid with misery, hardship, envy, and failure. Despite Castiglione, this view did not alter substantially in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Courtiers continued as a byword for corruption.[9] Emblematists enjoyed depicting them as carrion feeding on dead men; as mice gnawing a crown; and, most popular image of all, as sumptuously-clad noblemen imprisoned in the stocks.[10] Maurice de la Porte summarised the general opinion in his Epithêtes of 1571, where he provides fifty-seven synonyms for the word Courtisan, all of them pejorative; and concludes that 'to describe a man who is vicious to a superlative degree, one calls him Courtier'.[11]

Writers railed incessantly at the duplicity and dangers of court life. An especial favourite was Guevara who remarked that there are many at court who will 'doff their bonnet to you that gladly would see your heads off by the shoulders: and such there be that makes reverence unto you that would have his leg broken to see you dead and carried to your grave'. It was Guevara who castigated courtiers whose 'bowels and entrails are so damnable, and their hearts so crooked' that the novice courtier will think that they are giving him good advice, as they go about to deceive him and lead him to ruin. And it was Guevara who perpetuated a long tradition of jeering at the courtly sponger who, arriving late to gatecrash a banquet, and finding the table full, 'rather than fail, will sit of half a buttock'. And he reports that he himself had once seen three such spongers precariously balanced on one stool. [12]

English critics echoed such sentiments. In 1579, Haly Heron advised a young protégé to avoid court if he could: but, if not, to beware its 'common sickness' which is a 'surfeit in the banquets of dissembling'. Watch out, too, Heron warns, for ridiculous braggarts, one, for example, who 'bears the countenance of a lion', but whose courage is 'not worth a leek'; a wily fellow who shows every man his sword 'which hath been the death of so many frogs in Ireland'. [13] Sneers such as these remained current. Sir Thomas Overbury, himself destined to become a murder victim as a result of courtly intrigue and scandal, neatly encapsulated widespread contempt for the courtier. His surest mark, writes Overbury, is that he is found 'only about princes'.

'He smells; and putteth away much of his judgement about the situation of his clothes. He knows no man that is not generally known. His wit, like the marigold, openeth with the sun, and therefore he riseth not before ten of the clock. He puts more confidence in his words than meaning, and more in his pronunciation than his words. Occasion is his Cupid, and he hath but one receit of making love. He follows nothing but inconstancy, admires nothing but beauty, honours nothing but fortune. Loves nothing'.[14]

These are typical voices from a full, mighty, and constant chorus of complaint. What, then, had Castiglione achieved here?

Thirdly: if Castiglione had failed to quieten anti-court criticism, he had also done nothing to mitigate anti-italian sentiment. Ascham's bitter diatribe in the Scholemaster of 1570 is well-known. Italy, he admits, had once nurtured the worthiest men: but now that time had gone and, 'though the place remain, yet the old and present manners do differ as far as black and white, as virtue and vice'. It is no fit place for a young man to travel. Even the Italians themselves recognise that, 'Englese Italionato, e un diabolo incarnato'. Yet, though we may avoid Italy, its poison still flows in the filthy books translated into English, opening no common ways to vice:

'but such subtle, cunning, new, and diverse shifts, to carry young wits to mischief, to teach old bawds new school points, as the simple head of an Englishman is not able to invent, nor never was heard of in England before'.[15]

Even Sir Philip Sidney advised his younger brother to beware the 'tyrannous oppression' and 'servile yielding' of the Italians who were generally full of 'counterfeit learning', and, though superior in 'horsemanship, weapons, painting and such', were surpassed in most matters elsewhere.[16]

In France, the mincing affectation - real or alleged - of an Italianate court caused trumpets of wrath to bray forth; and not only was this anti-Italian sentiment generalised; it was also, on occasion, explicitly associated with Castiglione. Did not Philibert de Vienne publish his Lucianic satire against Il Cortegiano in 1547 as a reductio ad absurdum of the universally accomplished Italianate courtier?[17] Here everybody could see laid bare the venal purposes of Castiglione's dabbling dilettante whose 'singular good' is to have:

'Some pretty sprinkled judgement in the commonplaces and practices of all the liberal sciences, chopped up in hotchpot together', suitable for conducting an effective conversation - 'but no more'. 'Also to have store of histories, to pass the time meet for any company'.

'To interlace discourses with certain sudden lies and inventions of his own forging.'.

'To have knowledge of divers and sundry languages . . . that he may salute, rejoice, wonder at, exclaim upon, disdain, scorn, and flout whom he will'.

'To have some understanding of the state and affairs of the realm . . . and how he may honestly rob, deceive, and make his best profit'.[18]

Bowing and scraping are efficacious, but only when practised as a mean between vices: they must not be too little, lest we seem arrogant or ignorant; nor should they be too much, lest we be unmasked as sycophants. When giving advice it is important not to bother about the truth, but rather to follow 'the appetite and pleasure' of the prince and great men. The true philosopher of the court dissembles in order to advance himself by pleasing everybody. Stratagems enable him to blind the world, for to be open and simple is 'meet for beasts and idiots'. The French used to be like that:'yet now, God be thanked, they have prettily learned to live'.

Philibert's sole proviso on this art of pleasing is simply that it must be carried out with 'prudence'. It must always seem natural. And this Castiglionesque modification is then underscored by a final, significant exhortation: 'mark the Italian, his civility and courtesy'; so circumspect in evil-doing that he commonly escapes undetected. The Italians 'blush or bash at nothing'. If you think suddenly to surprise them, 'with a shrink of their shoulder they shake it off, and make good appearance'. They cover, hide, and repress their feelings with 'great patience and dissimulation'. They are, concludes Philibert, 'borne and bred in their country courtiers'.[19]

Now all of this, in Loyola's view, demonstrates that Castiglione's devices were detected; that he had changed nothing, since attitudes toward courtiers remained uniformly hostile; and that, if anything, he merely increased the general antipathy toward Italians.

Fourthly and finally, Loyola demands of Castiglione, where is the evil-doing essential for admittance to Lucifer's inner councils? Generations of readers have judged Il Cortegiano to be a 'golden book'. Did not Ascham, despite his hatred of Italy, yet praise Castiglione for teaching how to join learning with comely exercises? Did he not believe that Il Cortegiano 'advisedly read and diligently followed but one year at home in England, would do a young gentleman more good than three years travel abroad spent in Italy'? And did he not marvel that the book was not more read in the court than it was, 'seeing it is so well translated into English by a worthy gentleman Sir Thomas Hoby'?[20] Did not the great poet Tasso assert that Castiglione's name would be prized for as long as 'valour and courtesy have a dwelling in our spirits'?[21] Was not that model of courtiership, Sir Philip Sidney, regarded by Nashe as the very embodiment of Castiglione's ideal?[22] Did not Edward Vere, seventeenth Earl of Oxford, preface Clerke's Latin translation of 1571 with his conviction that the book described the 'highest and most perfect type of man'?[23] Did not the Japanese ambassadors, who passed through Mantua in 1585, regard Il Cortegiano as a most precious jewel; and did they not take a copy with them to be translated into their own language to enrich their countrymen with Italian policy?[24] Did not James Cleland who, in 1607, advised his young noble man not to tarry in Italy where one could scarcely escape the 'pleasures and diverse allurements to sin', nonetheless still confidently recommend Castiglione as 'very necessary and profitable for young gentlemen abiding in the court'?[25]

Indeed, have not scholars and critics continued to heap praise upon the book ever since? John Addington Symonds declared that Castiglione's courtier was a 'modern gentleman such as all men of education at the present day (1875) would wish to be'. And Professor Whitfield, only a few years ago, told us that for those who 'still believe in a cultivated society, this book remains the first genesis of that ideal'; and he repeated, with evident approval, the verdict of the Emperor Charles V, that Castiglione was 'one of the best knights in the world'. [26]

So Ignatius Loyola rests his case. Castiglione was neither innovator nor malefactor. The founder of the Jesuits can sit back comfortably in his chair and wait for the upstart Italian to follow Machiavelli into oblivion.

But Castiglione does not vanish. Instead he comes forward, smiling that the crass inconsistencies of Loyola's objections have thrown open for him the gateway to his ambitions. First: as an innovator his qualities are enhanced rather than diminished by the eclecticism of his perfect courtier: for, while it is true that most of the spare parts from which he constructs his ideal are familiar, the totality is incontestably something very different from any previous courtier who had been merely an aggregate of conventional vices. Henceforth he was to become the apotheosis of dilettantism; a scaled-down version of the omnicompetent Renaissance prince - a warrior, philosopher, linguist, historian, poet, musician, dancer, fencer, jouster, scholar, and lover. [27] In nothing was he to be too expert, or, at least, he must never soil his hands with an obvious professionalism. He was to accomplish everything with ease and grace. His hall-mark was to be that sprezzatura, vastly extended beyond the limits of its rhetorical antecedents, which was to remain an ideal of gentlemanly behaviour well into the twentieth century, and which has, perhaps, even now, not entirely disappeared.

In fact, cries Castiglione triumphantly, the immense vogue of his dilettante courtier is precisely the answer to Loyola's demand concerning evil innovation. Grace, studied nonchalance, and the purposes for which they are to be employed, together constitute the wormy core of his Cortegiano.

The ancient art of rhetoric is analysed and defended by Castiglione who wishes his courtier to be furnished with eloquence. But he goes far beyond this by combining with it the old chivalric ideal of franchise, and by so extending and elaborating the techniques of persuasion that they embrace the very life of the courtier. The relationship between matter and manner becomes transfigured into the relationship between what a man really is and how he seems. Il Cortegiano is replete with stratagems whereby the courtier might advantageously display his manifold skills. The issue is first raised during a recommendation of discreet self-praise: 'speaking such things after a sort, that it may appear that they are not rehearsed to that end'. [28] This counterfeit spontaneity is expressed through the two qualities grazia and sprezzatura. Indeed, grazia is so frequently employed to qualify the perfect courtier's actions that one of Castiglione's characters requests an explanation of the word which is 'put for a sauce to everything'. [29] He is told that there is one universal rule which helps define it: the courtier must, above all else, avoid affectation and must employ, in his every deed, a certain

studied nonchalance - sprezzatura. Every action should seem to be performed without conscious thought or effort. Evident strain renders any feat less striking: 'therefore, that may be said to be a very Art, that appeareth not to be Art; neither ought a man to put more diligence in any thing than in covering it'. On the other hand, nonchalance should never be so studied that it thereby fails in its purpose which is to conceal art. It is, for example, as bad to be slipshod in dress as it is for the courtier to keep 'in the bottom of his cap a looking-glass, and a comb in his sleeve, and to have always at his heels up and down the streets a page with a sponge and a brush'. [30] The purpose of nonchalance is to make every action appear natural. This is the fountain of all grace. And it affords an additional advantage, since it makes even the slightest attainment seem better than it really is.

Castiglione's courtier is engaged in a constant act of self-creation. He is always aware of an audience, admiring, criticising, and judging him; and he is expected to fashion himself like a work of art, arranging his good qualities to maximum effect, as skilful painters 'with a shadow make the lights of high places to appear'. He must weigh every word and deed, 'the place where it is done, in presence of whom, in what time, the cause why he doth it . . . the end whereto it tendeth, and the means that may bring him to it'. In war he must ensure that his bold feats are witnessed by those who matter, for it is meet to gain some advantage from deeds well done. In the tilt yard, he must look magnificent to 'draw unto him the eyes of the lookers-on, as the adamant doth iron'. In athletic pursuits, or in skills such as music, dancing, painting, and poetry, 'let him dissemble the studies and pains that a man must needs take in all things that are well done': but, in doing them excellently, he can thus make them 'much esteemed of other men'. [31]

Stress on appearances is one of Il Cortegiano's most striking features. Stress on the art of pleasing is another. Castiglione's courtier is both dissimulator and consummate toady. He must be agreeable to 'great men, gentlemen, and ladies'; 'pliable to be conversant with so many'; and every day he must alter his manner 'according to the disposition of them he is conversant withall'. He must be acceptable to the authorities; and his relationship with his ruler is unhealthily ambiguous. Book Two suggests that the courtier is to serve his prince with devotion and, 'in his will, manners, and fashions to be altogether pliable to please him'. One interlocutor promptly exclaims that there are plenty such courtiers nowadays: 'for (me think) in few words ye have painted us out a jolly flatterer'. [32] This is staunchly denied, but the argument runs into difficulties when confronted by the unworthy demands of a wicked ruler. Obedience is then justified on two very dubious grounds. First, that many things might appear good which, in truth, are evil; while many seem evil, yet are, notwithstanding, good. Secondly, that it is a dangerous matter for a courtier to swerve from the command of his superiors, 'trusting more in his own judgement than in theirs, which of reason he ought to obey'. [33] Il Cortegiano, it is true, does insist that when courtly capacities are directed to a good end, they merit 'infinite praise'; but we are, unfortunately, left in doubt as to the precise nature of that good end. Are all the courtier's wondrous accomplishments designed, as Castiglione himself writes, as an 'instrument to obtain the good will of women'? [34] This, after all, appears to be the case throughout the greater part of the text. Or

are they intended to win the favour of a prince to such an extent that the courtier will be able to serve his master virtuously by telling him unpalatable truths without fear? This is the claim made, as an afterthought, in the final book of Il Cortegiano. Servility here receives its moralistic justification as it were en passant. Only one thing remains clear: that Castiglione's courtier is concerned to advance his career - politically by ingratiating himself with authority; amorously by fascinating the ladies.

The overall effect of Il Cortegiano is one of glossy superficiality; and any serious intentions of its courtier are overlaid with deeds displaying his grazia. Despite Castiglione's repeated censures on excessive sprezzatura, that is affectation, the nonchalance is too premeditated. This perfect courtier tries too hard to appear not to be trying. He is too aware of having to make an effect upon an audience. And he pays a heavy price in terms of honesty, reliability, and loyalty.

Yet it was in vain that Philibert jeered at this monstrous hypertrophy of the art of pleasing, in which the gentleman-courtier had to be

> 'pliant like wax, ready to receive any honest or friendly impression, for if it be needful to laugh, he rejoiceth: if to be sad, he lowreth; if to be angry, he frowneth; if to feed, he eateth; if to fast, he pineth'.

It was in vain that Philibert pilloried this courtier who was prepared to do 'whatsoever it be, according to the humours and complexions of his fellowship and courtly company, although his affections are clean contrary'.[35] There was much force in Philibert's bitter jest: but satire of this kind is on extremely treacherous ground - as will be appreciated by those who have endured the rapid fluctuations of educational fashion in the latter half of the twentieth century. This year's absurdity may become next year's normalcy. There is little evidence that Philibert's brilliant work was appreciated, even in France; and when, in 1575, an English translation was published, there was scant awareness that the original text had been a satire. Instead it was offered as perfectly serious advice on how to succeed at court.[36] The translator, George North, dedicated his work to Christopher Hatton who would, he said, find in it 'both flowers and fruit of courtly philosophy'; and who might, North hoped, spread the 'gladsome beams' of his 'favourable cheer' upon it so that other gentlemen-courtiers would more readily accept it.[37] We do not know how those other gentlemen responded; but one especially avid reader and place-seeker, Gabriel Harvey, set 'Philibert's Philosopher of the Court' at the head of a series of courtly guides including Castiglione's Libro del Cortegiano - the very work derided by Philibert![38]

The issue may be clarified by an easily verifiable observation. We may find justifications for courtly climbing and time-serving pliancy elsewhere, and in disturbing, non-satirical contexts. Even Guevara exhorts the courtier 'wholly to love that which the prince loveth; and to follow that which the prince followeth'. The courtier may count himself happy,

> 'if he can frame himself to commend that that the prince alloweth, and likewise to disallow that that the prince misliketh: and though perhaps he were many times of the contrary opinion, he may well think and believe to himself what he liketh best, but in no case to utter that he thinketh, nor to make any countenance to the contrary'.[39]

And consider the seriousness with which George Puttenham offers exactly similar counsel - Puttenham, that is, whose concern for courtly strategies within his principal context of poetic devices aptly illustrates the continuing relationship between rhetoric and rhetorical behaviour. He recommends that the English courtier be 'apt and accommodate' in the prince's commendable delights: 'as if the prince be given to hawking, hunting, riding of horses, or playing upon instruments, or any like exercise, the servitor to be the like'. The servitor may even 'study to be like them by imitation: as in wearing their hair long or short, or in this or that sort of apparel'.[40]

The fundamental difficulty facing satirical critics of courtly ethics was that, as they themselves frequently acknowledged, the desiderata for prospering at court were precisely those they felt obliged to mock. Castiglione's courtliness was an ideal of extreme fragility: but the alternative moralistic pattern was, because of its unrealism, scarcely less frangible. Under the exigencies of practical politics courtiers would often find themselves driven to dissimulate their real feelings; to simulate false; and to flatter, cajole, and bribe. Castiglione's statement on how to succeed at court continued to compel not merely because it depicted an attractive ideal. It also enshrined an unhappy truth. Temporal success is usually obtained by sedulously cultivating the good opinion of those who already enjoy it.

The crooked path to material prosperity offended anti-court writers who often maintained that the only way to avoid courtly corruption was to avoid court: counsel scarcely helpful to men who were already inextricably enmeshed in worldly affairs. Indeed, the mediaeval traditionalist Alain Chartier and the Renaissance humanist Antonio de Guevara, who both waxed eloquent on this theme, had both followed courtly careers and enjoyed court patronage. As Francesco Guicciardini remarked in an early version of his Ricordi:

> 'Do not believe those who profess to have abandoned affairs and greatness deliberately and from love of a peaceful life. Nearly always the reason has been thoughtlessness or necessity. Hence experience shows us that almost everyone who is offered some opportunity of returning to their former life, will leave their prized peace and quiet and throw themselves into work with the speed of fire spreading in dry and oily materials'.[41]

Castiglione's Il Cortegiano was published for the first time in 1528, with Venetian and Florentine editions appearing in the spring and autumn respectively; and a further three editions followed within the next two years. It is thus possible, and even likely, that one of these was at Guicciardini's elbow when he added the following observation to his final revision of the Ricordi in 1530.

> 'When I was young I despised music, dancing, singing, and such frivolities. Also I despised fine writing, horsemanship, the art of dressing well, and all things which seem to be more

ornamental than essential to man. But later I regretted it, for although it is a mistake to waste too much time on them, and therefore perhaps to educate the young in them for fear they go astray, nevertheless my experience has been that such adornments and the ability to do everything well add dignity and reputation even to the best qualified. So one may say that those who lack these skills lack something of value. Apart from that, the possession of such accomplishments opens the way to the favour of princes, and for those who abound in them it may be the beginning or cause of immense profit and promotion, since the world and its princes are not made as they should be, but as they are'. [42]

When a hard-headed paragon of political acuity extols the practical advantages of 'frivolities' and things 'ornamental', it is time to take heed. Inspired directly by Castiglione or not, Guicciardini's courtly aphorism expresses a similar view of how best to curry princely favour. And the history of the Ricordi casts further light into those gloomy recesses of the Renaissance mind where satire on self-seeking could be confused with right and proper behaviour.

It is noteworthy of the Ricordi that it was not only in his advocacy of dilettantism that Guicciardini touched upon the arts of the courtier. Repeatedly he noted careerist techniques: exercising care in speech; avoiding all unnecessary displeasing acts; using pleasant words; dissimulating one's own displeasure; making influential friends; keeping within the prince's view; recognising the perils of princely favour; shunning the reputation of being suspicious while, nonetheless, not being too trusting; keeping secrets; finding the right approach for the conduct of one's affairs; choosing the time for making unavoidable enemies, and knowing best how to attack them. [43] Guicciardini's aphorisms furnish a glimpse of the naked, pragmatic flesh concealed beneath the sumptuous raiment of Castiglione's courtier: but their explicit cynicism was not intended for contemporary scrutiny, and it was not until 1576 that a version of the Ricordi was put into print. But thereafter versions of these tough, muscular maxims were being published, translated, and adapted throughout Europe. [44] What had once been the personal reflections of an acute intelligence upon the inner workings of the politics of his own period became the public property of another era. This transition, from the secrecy of a private notebook to the publicity of print and popular acclaim, tells us something about the degree to which overt self-seeking had become socially acceptable in the late sixteenth century.

The impact of Castiglione's courtly vision is undeniable. From its first publication through to 1619, Il Cortegiano appeared in at least 110 different editions, comprising some sixty Italian versions, sixteen French translations, seventeen Spanish, thirteen Latin, four English, and two German. It was the most widely and frequently reproduced courtly text, and it had no serious rival in the sixteenth century. Increasingly, however, the book had to face ecclesiastical censure - not for any of the several possible fundamental reasons, but largely because of its levity at the expense of clerics - and though expurgated editions appeared in Italy, even these dried up in 1606; and well over a century was to pass before the next Italian issue. Elsewhere the story was similar, and two Latin editions at Strasburg (one in 1619, the other in 1663) mark the end of one period of intense

Castiglione publication, and the beginning of another altogether more sparse era. [45]

What, if anything, took the place of Il Cortegiano as a vade mecum for courtiers? [46] Curious books there were, which completed the transformation of the genial, rather foppish Castiglionesque creature into something which, though perfectly recognisable as his progeny, had now become totally divorced from those old chivalric values of honesty, loyalty, and service which had still, at the very least, been acknowledged in Il Cortegiano. There is no more arrestingly strange treatise in the history of courtly literature than Lorenzo Ducci's Arte aulica published in Italian in 1601 and again in 1615, and in an English translation in 1607. [47] Ducci's tone is of such chilling and extravagant egoism that it might be interpreted as an echo of the more malicious passages in Philibert's satire, were it not for the fact that the author himself, his English translator, and his admiring Italian editor, are all in evident, and deadly, earnest. Edward Blount offered his English version to the brothers, William Earl of Pembroke, and Philip Earl of Montgomery (the patrons of the first folio Shakespeare), as something which they might find useful in the pursuit of their careers at court. Martinelli dedicated his edition to - of all people - the reigning Duke of Urbino, saying that the world desired a reprint of Ducci's work, so full of 'charm and curiosity', and especially admirable for its being based upon the 'prince of political writers, Cornelius Tacitus'. Now each reader would be able to enjoy it and draw from it 'that utility which he desires'. Just what that 'utility' was had already been set forth by Ducci on his original title-page: he was teaching the courtier 'how to behave himself in order to gain his prince's favour'. And to achieve this we have Il Cortegiano's versatility, and its art of seeming without necessarily being, pressed to their logical conclusions.

For Ducci, the ends 'or scopes that the courtier hath are three: that is his proper interest, and this is that which he chiefly endeavoureth: next, the favour of the prince, as the cause of the first end: and then the service of the prince as the efficient cause of that favour'. The courtier's own, or proper, interest is simply to get whatever he can. He is solely concerned with profit: that is with riches and possessions; and with honours which are 'degrees, dignities, power, wealth, and the reputation which springs from them'. Ducci advises his courtier to conceal the 'endeavour of his proper commodities' under the 'apparent desire of the prince's service'. This is the highway to remuneration. Beauty of body, learning, nobility, and all similar qualities are important only to the extent to which they may be exercised on behalf of a prince to gain his good will. [48]

This courtier is a dedicated climber, insinuating himself into the 'confines of other men's offices' so that he may further his career. In the end, he may even aspire to control every office through his own hirelings, since princes are congenitally lazy, and prefer to leave business to some employee. To achieve this position the courtier must master not only his own job, but must also strive to please his master in all things. This is the goodly goal to which Castiglione's versatility inevitably led. Similarly his art of seeming is easily adapted by Ducci who points out that many petty services which appear almost unworthy of consideration, 'only accompanied with an effective

show, have been the beginnings of special rewards and incredible favours'. Ducci's sole qualification of this is likewise Castiglionesque: for the courtier must avoid 'curious and open affectation' which might earn him the reputation of a dissimulator and incur the prince's hatred or scorn. This is, of course, to be avoided at all costs; and, just as the tailor must know cloth, the smith iron, and the mason marble, so the courtier must acquire a perfect knowledge of his master, 'in order to induce and gently wrest into the prince's mind a love and liking of him.' [49]

For Castiglione 'pliancy to please' had been an important aspect of the courtier's art. For old-fashioned Sir Thomas Elyot it had been a form of flattery and an object of contempt. Philibert had mocked it. Guevara had equivocated it. And Puttenham had given it a guarded recommendation. Ducci, typically, reduces it to a system. Princes, like all other people, love what is like themselves, 'because self-love is the root of all other loves'. So, where the prince is warlike, the courtier is a warrior; where he delights in knowledge, the courtier professes learning and letters; and if he is religious, then the courtier, too, must appear devout.

Especially valuable in the winning of favour is facility of speech; and Ducci, like Castiglione, has much to say on the art of eloquence and persuasion: but it is as though Il Cortegiano is being refracted through a distorting lense. A ready and honeyed tongue enables the courtly aspirant to ingratiate himself with authority; to win patronage for his own minions; and, best of all, 'to dive and sound into the deepest thoughts and affections of his lord, and to shew in himself a disposition and nature pliable and conformable thereunto'. Flattery, the constant target for moralists, is regarded by Ducci as the best way to secure advancement, and as absolutely necessary 'to whomsoever serveth'. Naturally, abject sycophancy is not recommended for it is too transparent: but the artistry of subtle adulation is a desideratum, and Ducci defines this as 'an honour, which either deservedly or undeservedly is given by an inferior unto the superior, to the end to please him for his own benefit or interest'. Laudation best succeeds when it is legitimate; but where true merit is deficient then the courtier must have recourse to judicious 'amplifying or enlarging'. And if, unhappily, there is no merit at all to work on, then 'it is lawful to help yourself with that kind (of flattery) which makes an attribute of some good parts where none are' [50] Through skill in speech, Ducci's courtier may win his way into the prince's confidence, and aspire to serve him in special, private purposes. 'And such particularly are the excesses or extremes of some affection', such as ambition, covetousness, wrath, revenge, and - most effective of all - illicit love which can seldom be satisfied without some action 'disrobing the prince of decency and decorum'. The courtier will be required to play some evil part in the prince's designs; and, as Ducci reminds his more squeamish pupils, virtue is all very well, but service demands the execution of extraordinary things. Moreover, no evil is so monstrous that it may not be 'washed away by the greatness of the benefits which, by the prince's favour, are many times obtained'. [51]

Ducci's extraordinary book never achieved the success merited by its cynicism - bracing as a lungful of fresh, salt sea air. Its ideas were, however, widely disseminated; for they were read, inwardly digested, and then discreetly regurgitated by Eustache du Refuge whose

Traité de la cour, first published at Paris in 1617, went on to achieve remarkable popularity, with French, English, Italian, German and Latin versions, continuing into the early eighteenth century. [52] When John Reynolds issued his English translation of the Traité de la cour, he dedicated it to Prince Charles, son of James I, and assured his readers that the French author had depicted his courtier

> 'in so lively a shape . . . . and in such rich colours, that when we find a Commonwealth so governed as that of Plato; an Orator so fluent as that of Cicero; or a Captain so valiant as that of Xenophon; then it is possible for us to meet with the courtier of Mons. du Refuge: difficultly before'. [53]

Yet, upon examination, the treatise concerns the same egocentric, time-serving creature, by now familiar to us: the courtier who seeks constantly to allure men with a 'pleasing countenance', and who regards good deeds as the 'fetters and manacles wherewith we may enchain and captivate others'. Morality is reduced, by du Refuge, to the mere weighing of advantages and disadvantages. If the 'profits exceed the prejudices' in number, gravity, and importance, we judge a matter to be good; if not, then we reject it as evil. To gain reputation and material success we must ask ourselves if we are disposed to flatter not only great men but also their very grooms; to wait upon some porter after he has kept us waiting while we count the 'nails of the gate or door'; to suffer scandal and calumny; to tolerate injuries; and to accommodate ourselves to other men's pleasures or passions. For it is with this 'price and coin that this merchandise of the court is purchased and bought'. Flattery is the indispensable tool for courtiers who may be forced to imitate not only the virtues but also the vices of those with whom they have to deal. They must be 'conformable and flexible' to every humour and fashion, while never making apparent the constraints under which they operate. Flattery enables the courtier to 'work and screw himself into his prince's favour'. [54] Thus du Refuge in his book which, John Reynolds assured Prince Charles, was designed to show courtiers 'not how great, but how good they are bound to make themselves in their conduction, both to their Prince and Country'. [55]

This smooth-tongued treatise remained in circulation for over a century: although, in the latter decades of its career, it was supplanted both in popularity and authoritativeness by the work of another author. And here Castiglione springs his master stratagem: for his last witness (to complete the humiliation of Loyola) is a Spanish Jesuit, Baltazar Gracián whose Oraculo Manual y Arte de Prudencia, from its first publication in 1647, rapidly became a European best-seller, and has remained in vogue ever since. [56] Gracián's work has no plan. It is simply a collection of 300 aphorisms for the practising courtier. They are mostly cynical; and all are written with a concise elegance, mordant wit, and considerable linguistic virtuosity.

What was it that readers in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries found so congenial? The Oracle's deliberate formlessness makes adequate summary impossible. But the flavour of the text is easily conveyed. There are aphorisms on keeping men in suspense; making them dependent; avoiding jealousy; and provoking confusion, since life is a 'manoeuvre against the malice of men'. [57] There is advice on how to play on people's weaknesses ('the key to the

will of one's fellows'); how to conceal one's own; keeping in with the right people; and making the best use both of friends and enemies.[58] Gracián tells how to keep silent; how to take hints, and when to refuse a request; when to bide one's time; and how to control the passions, for the 'emotions are breaches in the defences of the mind'.[59] He has much to say on adaptability, evasiveness, and the need to act as a 'discreet Proteus'; and he recommends the 'holy cunning' of achieving one's ends by initially furthering somebody else's, while elsewhere warning that this device may be used against us.[60] Gracián extols the virtue of keeping 'a cool head during fits of rage'; of executing everything pleasant ourselves, and everything unpleasant through intermediaries; of taking advantage of another's needs which, if they develop into a craving, constitute 'the most effective of thumbscrews'; and of learning when to contradict, since 'an affected doubt is curiosity's most subtle picklock'. The courtier is exhorted to avoid the reputation of cunning by letting his 'greatest skill reside in concealing what is regarded as deceit'. True knowledge is 'knowing how to live', and this involves intermingling the guile of the serpent with the candour of the dove; and using sweet words in that 'great art' which is to 'know how to sell air'. We must never be dragged down by other people's misfortunes, and must recognise the man 'who is stuck in the mud'. But we ourselves must know when it is time to retire from the fray.[61]

For Gracián, having real capacities is important: but appearances are more important still. It is, therefore, necessary for the courtier to refine and polish his natural aptitudes. 'Gracious deportment is the adornment of life', for it provides the best way to attain 'every worthy end'. Ability must be displayed with care, for extremes should be found in the talent, 'and moderation in the manner of revealing it'; while the more numerous the gifts, the less 'affectation should there be'. On the other hand, attainments should by no means be hidden under a bushel. The courtier must always behave as though he has an audience, and must remember that a 'good exterior is the best witness to interior perfection'. When great talent is combined with the ability to display it, 'it is regarded as prodigious'. But, above all other attributes - greasing every wheel of courtly commerce - is the quality of 'secret Charm: what the French call la je-ne-sais-quoi', and what the Italians have described as <u>sprezzatura</u>:

> 'Charm is the life of natural endowments, the breath of speech, the soul of action, the adornment of adornments themselves. Other gifts are a natural embellishment; but charm is the adornment of perfection itself. It is appreciated even in discourse. It is, in the main, a gift; it owes least to study and even rises above discipline; it is more than ease of deportment, and is superior to gallantry; it implies a natural manner and adds the finishing touch (to everything); without it all beauty is lifeless and all grace, disgrace; it surpasses courage, discretion, prudence, sovereignty itself. It provides a polite and speedy means to the achievement of one's ends, and an urbane way out of every tight corner'.[62]

With the courtly aphorisms of a seventeenth-century Jesuit we may appear to have wandered far from our starting point. It is, however, not difficult to retrace our steps. Ducci's <u>Arte aulica</u>, du Refuge's <u>Traité de la cour</u>, Gracián's <u>Oraculo</u>: they are all, in

various ways, <u>Il Cortegiano</u> gone bad. It really is but a short step from Castiglione's Ciceronian slipperiness to their Tacitean explicitness. There is similar emphasis on effective modes of discourse, ranging from gravity to jest. There is a similar array of courtly stratagems. There is similar attention paid to fine proportion; the avoidance of evident extremes; and the pursuit of the golden mean, or at least its semblance. There is similar concern for conveying an air of ease, grace, and naturalness even when stretched to the limits of one's capacities. There is similar stress on maintaining appearances and on seeming rather than being. And there is a similar end for all the tricks, devices, postures, and effectivenesses: self-advancement, material success, reputation, place, and profit. Finally, the sophisticated yet overt egotism of the later theorists was - like Castiglione's <u>Il Cortegiano</u> - neither conceived nor received as some awful warning against the evils of court life. It was regarded as it was intended: as sensible, practical advice on how to make friends and influence people in the highest places. This, in truth, was the triumph of Castiglionesque manner over matter. The arts of sycophancy and dissimulation had become respectable and had no need to cover their naughty parts in order to appear in public.

So, we may ask in conclusion: what happened in Lucifer's inner sanctum? Poor Ignatius! Rebutted on all points; and with the crowning indignity of seeing a member of his own order appearing on his rival's behalf! What could he say? Everybody feared and abused the Jesuits. In England and France, especially, they were execrated and hounded; and their reputation was not especially sweet elsewhere. Castiglione, on the other hand, unlike the incompetent Machiavel, had 'wrought artificially'. He had 'concealed his mine' so that his adversaries perceived it not. Wide approbation, emulation, and a largely undetected corruption of manners - these were his glorious achievements. Charm, grace, <u>sprezzatura</u>, and the art of pleasing had won the day. And the time has come, if I may borrow Urquhart's memorable phrase, 'to put a gallant catastrophe to that so-long-dubious combat'.[63] Ignatius, for all his guile, is thrust down. Count Baldassare, affable, unruffled, scarcely panting (and certainly not sweating), assumes the chair of highest dishonour beside Lucifer. And I, having, perhaps revealed rather too much about promotion to chairs, had best follow Machiavel's example and 'at last vanish'.

NOTES

1. John Donne, Conclaue Ignati: accessit & apologia pro Iesuitis (n.p., 1611). For an excellent modern edition of the contemporary English translation, see Ignatius His Conclave, ed. T. S. Healy (Oxford, 1969).

2. For a discussion of Ignatius's handling of Machiavel, see my 'More Machiavellian than Machiavel. A Study of the Context of Donne's Conclave', in John Donne. Essays in Celebration, ed. A. J. Smith (London, 1972), pp.349-84.

3. Il Cortegiano, I.33. I quote Hoby's English translation, partly for simplicity's sake, but also because it offers important insights into sixteenth-century attitudes. My references are to the traditionally accepted chapter divisions of the Italian text.

4. For a fuller statment of my own view of Castiglione's contribution to debate on courtly topics, see 'The Courtier. The Renaissance and changing ideals', in The Courts of Europe. Politics, Patronage and Royalty. 1400-1800, ed. A. G. Dickens (London, 1977), pp. 32-53.

5. Gioviano Pontano's De sermone was composed around the end of the fifteenth century. For an informative discussion of the text, see Georg Luck, 'Vir Facetus: a Renaissance Ideal', Studies in Philology, LV (1958), pp.107-121.

6. Quintilian, De oratore, VIII.18, 23; XI.47; XII.79-80.

7. Michel le Faucheur, Traité de l'Action de l'orateur ou de la prononciation et du geste (Paris, 1676), pp.81-82; tr. as An Essay upon the Action of an Orator; as to his Pronunciation and Gesture (London, n.d.), p.72. For a different interpretation of Maillard's 'fameux Hem hem hem', see his Oeuvres, ed. A. de la Borderie (Nantes, 1877), p.64, n.12.

8. Rabelais, Gargantua, XIX. The original French coughs are less expectorant. They read: 'Ehen, hen hen . . . hen, hen, hasch . . . hen, hen, ehen, hasch . . . Hen, hasch, hasch, grenhenhasch'.

9. See Claus Uhlig, Hofkritik im England des Mittelalters und der Renaissance (Berlin, 1973); Pauline Smith, The Anti-Courtier Trend in sixteenth century French Literature (Geneva, 1966).

10. See 'The Courtier. The Renaissance and changing ideals', op.cit., pp.44-49.

11. Maurice de la Porte, Les epithêtes (Paris, 1571), fols. 70^{v}-71^{r}.

12. Antonio de Guevara, The diall of princes (London, 1568), Lib.IV, fols.122^{v}, 125^{v}.

13. Haly Heron, A newe discourse of morall philosophie, entituled the Kayes of Counsaile (London, 1579), Sig.A.ii^{v}-iii^{v}, p.49.

14. The Miscellaneous Works in prose and verse of Sir Thomas Overbury, Knight, ed. E. F. Rimbault (London, 1856), pp. 52-53.

15. The Whole Works of Roger Ascham, ed. J. A. Giles (London, 1864), III, pp.156-67.

16. The Correspondence of Sir Philip Sidney and Hubert Languet, ed. S. A. Pears (London, 1845), p.198.

17. Philibert de Vienne, Le philosophe de cour (J. de Tournes: Lyons, 1547); tr. George North, The Philosopher of the Court (London, 1575). On this text, see C. A. Mayer, 'L'Honnête Homme, Molière and Philibert de Vienne's Philosophe de court', Modern Language Review, XLVI (1951); D. Javitch, 'The Philosopher of the Court: a French Satire Misunderstood', Comparative Literature, XXIII (1971); Pauline Smith, op.cit., pp.138-47.

18. Philosopher of the Court (1575), pp.30-31.

19. Ibid., pp.58-59, 91, 100-101, 109-112.

20. Ascham, op.cit., p.141.

21. Torquato Tasso, Il Malpiglio, o vero de la corte, in I Dialoghi di Torquato Tasso, ed. C. Guasti (Florence, 1858-1859), III, p.6. Tasso's position is, however, rather ambiguous for he hints at having some reservations concerning Castiglione. It is also interesting to note that this little dialogue ends with a statement that excellence in letters is not as necessary for the courtier as the prudence and cleverness to know when to display it. 'Nevertheless, one without the other seems imperfect'.

22. Thomas Nashe, The Anatomie of Absurditie, in The Works of Thomas Nashe, ed. R. B. McKerrow (London, 1904-1910), I, p.7.

23. B. Castilionis de curiali sive aulico libri quatuor (J. Day: London, 1571). Vere himself, with his violent temper, extravagance, and love of perfumed leather jerkins, was, perhaps, less than perfect.

24. I. Donesmondi, Dell'istoria ecclesiastica di Mantova . . . parte seconda (Mantua, 1616), pp.151-2. There is, at p.266, a further reference to the Japanese visit.

25. James Cleland, The Institution of a young noble man (Oxford, 1607), pp.153, 266.

26. J. A. Symonds, Renaissance in Italy (London, 1875), I, p.145; J. H. Whitfield, intro. to the revised Everyman edition of The Book of the Courtier (London, 1974).

27. See, for example, my Great Tournament Roll of Westminster (Oxford, 1968), I, Cap.I; G. E. Waas, The Legendary Character of Kaiser Maximilian (New York, 1941); R. A. Lecoy de la Marche, Le Roi René: sa vie, son administration, ses travaux artistiques et littéraires (Paris, 1875); Otto Cartellieri, The Court of Burgundy (London, 1929).

28. Il Cortegiano,I.18.

29. Ibid., I.24.

30. Ibid., I. 26, 27.

31. Ibid., II.7, 8, 12.

32. Ibid., II.17, 18.

33. Ibid., II.20, 23, 24.

34. Ibid., III.52, 53.

35. Philosopher of the Court, pp.108-9.

36. On this curious misreading, see Javitch's article cited above, n.17.

37. North's dedication to the Philosopher of the Court (1575), Sig.A.2^{v}-3^{v}.

38. Gabriel Harvey, Letter Book, ed. E. J. L. Scott (London, 1884), pp.78-79.

39. Guevara, op.cit., fol.118^{v}.

40. George Puttenham, The Arte of English Poesie (London, 1589), III, Cap.24. On the general relationship between poetic and courtly devices, see D. Javitch, Poetry and Courtliness in Renaissance England (Princeton, 1978). His second chapter is largely devoted to Puttenham.

41. Francesco Guicciardini, Ricordi, version C, No.17. The standard critical edition remains that ed. by R. Spongano, Ricordi (Florence, 1951). I quote the excellent tr. by Margaret Grayson in the ed. by Cecil Grayson, Francesco Guicciardini. Selected Writings (London, 1965), p.9.

42. Ibid., version C, No.179; ed.cit., p.45.

43. Ibid., version C, Nos.7, 25, 26, 86, 90, 94, 133, 158, 184, 186, 198, 217.

44. The first edition of the Ricordi was prepared by that interesting Florentine at the court of Catherine de Medici, Jacopo Corbinelli, Piu consigli et avvertimenti (F. Morello: Paris, 1576); and within the year this version had been tr. into French and published in Paris. For the history of the Ricordi and its diffusion throughout Europe, see V. Luciani, Francesco Guicciardini e la fortuna dell'opera sua (Florence, 1949). This is superior to the original version, Francesco Guicciardini and his European Reputation (New York, 1936).

45. For the early bibliographical history of Il Cortegiano, see the list of editions appended to the translation by L. E. Opdyke, The Book of the Courtier (New York, 1901), pp.419-21.

46. For valuable bibliographical information concerning courtly literature see the lists appended to Ruth Kelso, The Doctrine of the English Gentleman in the Sixteenth Century (University of Illinois Studies in Language and Literature, XIV, 1929), pp.169-277; and to the same author's Doctrine for the Lady of the Renaissance (Illinois, 1956), pp.424-62. There is a mass of relevant information in M. Magendie, La Politesse Mondaine et les theories de l'honnêteté en France, au XVIIe siecle, de 1600 a 1660 (Paris, 1925).

47. Arte aulica di Lorenzo Ducci, nella quale s'insegna il modo che deve tenere il Cortigiano per divenir possessore della gratia del suo Principe (Ferrara, 1601); Arte aulica Del Signor Lorenzo Ducci. Opera fondata sopra Cornelio Tacito, ed. Paolo Martinelli (Viterbo, 1615); Ars aulica or the Courtiers arte, tr. E. Blount (London, 1607).

48. Ducci (1607), pp.9-10, 17, 25, 33, 40, 64.

49. Ibid., pp.81, 84, 87, 88, 91, 100.

50. Ibid., pp.121, 154-7, 170-1.

51. Ibid., pp.186-7, 194.

52. Up to 1672 there were at least fourteen editions of du Refuge's book in France. It was tr. into Italian in 1621; English in 1622; German in 1664; and there were several Latin versions (1642, 1644, 1649, 1684). There was, in addition, a Latin rendering of the second book alone which was subsequently tr. back into French as an anonymous work. Moreover, in 1652, the second book was tr. into English as Arcana Aulica, in which guise it was reissued eight times up to 1728, and was unwittingly tr. back into French, again as an anonymous work, in 1695 and 1716.

53. Du Refuge, A Treatise of the Court, tr. Reynolds (London, 1622), I, Sig.(a)[v].

54. Ibid., pp.20-22, 100-101, 106, 124, 154.

55. Ibid., Sig.A.2[v].

56. The most important disseminator of Gracián's maxims was Amelot de la Houssaie whose French version, L'Homme de Cour (Paris, 1684) was reissued some fifteen times up to 1716, and was itself the source for English, Italian, and German translations before the end of the seventeenth century. In many ways the most informative, and certainly the most convenient, edition of this work is that prepared by L. B. Walton for the Everyman's Library (London, 1962), which has a valuable introduction, notes, and bibliography, and provides parallel Spanish and English texts. My citations are from Walton's edition.

57. Gracian, The Oracle, Nos. 3, 5, 7, 13, 17, 94, 95.

58. Ibid., Nos. 26, 126, 31, 158, 84.

59. Ibid., Nos. 33, 70, 37, 55, 52, 69, 98, 179, 222.

60. Ibid., Nos. 58, 73, 77, 288, 144, 193.

61. Ibid., Nos. 155, 187, 189, 213, 219, 232, 243, 267, 285, 110.

62. Ibid., Nos. 12, 14, 85, 123, 297, 130, 277, 127.

63. The Discovery of a most exquisite Jewel in The Works of Sir Thomas Urquhart of Cromarty, Knight, ed. G. Maitland (The Maitland Club, Edinburgh, 1834), p.223.



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