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# The Divine Tribunal

*an Inaugural Lecture  
delivered at the University College of Swansea  
on 3 December, 1974*

*by*

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M.A., D.Phil., D.Litt.  
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## THE DIVINE TRIBUNAL

The belief that man after death awaits a divine judgment in which his life on this earth will be scrutinized is found in more than one religion, ancient and modern, and in this lecture I propose to consider how the belief developed. I shall be attempting, then, a brief essay in the history of ideas, and I hope to make a few new suggestions about the relation between various forms of the belief.

To us the most familiar expression of it occurs in the Book of Revelation, where the writer has a vision of the last things :

*I could see the dead, great and small, standing before the throne ; and books were opened. Then another book was opened, the roll of the living. From what was written in these books the dead were judged upon the record of their deeds.*

(Rev. 20. 12.)

My Biblical quotations, by the way, are taken from the New English Bible. We are told afterwards (v. 15) that there was a lake of fire which was ' the second death ' ; and that into it ' were flung any whose names were not to be found in the roll of the living.' Allusions to a final judgement also occur in the Gospels, but there the emphasis is sometimes rather different, implying a Messianic judgement of the nations in favour of Israel, as when Matthew (25. 31-2) says that ' when the Son of Man comes in his glory and all the angels with him, he will sit in state on his throne, with all the nations gathered before him.' But the judgement of individuals *within* the nations is afterwards implied, and this is certainly the idea which was later established as the norm of Christian belief.

Theologians of different schools naturally react in various ways to the doctrine of the Last Judgement.



A tendency of the radical-liberal school has been to recognize a moral truth in it, but to insist at the same time that the divine judgement is not something which will crown the end of the ages, but an experience that is ever present. Indeed a modern Welsh poet<sup>1</sup> asks that he may feel this immediacy :

*(Rho weld)*  
*Pob nos yn nos y bradychir Ef,*  
*Pob dydd yn ddydd y Farn.*

(‘Grant me to see every night as a night when He is betrayed, every day as a day of Judgement.’) It reminds one a little of the current debate about examinations. Should there be one big test at the end or is it better to have a process of continuous assessment? I am not at all sure myself that it would be more comfortable to find that every day is a day of judgement.

However, my concern is with the origins of this idea, which the New Testament usually locates quite clearly after death and at the end of time. It is a theme that has inspired some fine creations in literature and art. Indirectly it influenced notable facets of the work of Dostoevsky and Kafka, and a direct presentation of it is found in one of the best poems of Goronwy Owen, who led the Welsh neo-classical movement in the eighteenth century. The well-known Latin hymn by Thomas of Celano in the thirteenth century opens with a description of ‘the day of wrath, that day when the world will turn into ashes’ :

*Dies irae, dies illa,*  
*Solvat saeculum in favilla.*

We are thus reminded that another feature of the Last Judgement is cosmic dissolution. A conflagration from heaven is envisaged (2 Pet. 3. 12). Within the New Testament, therefore, there are three aspects of the scene of judgement. First, there is the vindication of Israel

among the nations ; secondly, there is the cosmic upheaval which brings an end to this world as it is, although in one allusion a cycle of a thousand years precedes the final act, a time when Christ and his saints will rule (Rev. 20. 4) ; and thirdly, there is the scrutiny of the life of each individual which will result in the due reward or punishment.

The first and third of these ideas have a certain moral content. Hebrew nationalism is the matrix of the idea that the nations shall be judged. It involves a moral readjustment of the order of things, for the small nation which has been oppressed and scattered shall not only recover her freedom, according to this belief, but shall herself lead the nations under God’s command. The idea that a man’s personal life in the world should be examined impartially has a moral quality that is both individual and universal. We are told that the examination is conducted in relation to written records : ‘the dead were judged upon the record of their deeds.’ (Rev. 20. 12).

If we ask where the writer of the Book of Revelation is likely to have derived this idea, as well as the others which make up his picture of judgement, the answer is not far to seek. It is generally accepted that the immediate source is the Book of Daniel and the related apocalyptic literature of the last two centuries B.C. This literature is so-called because it claims to unveil the future realities which await man. In the seventh chapter of the Book of Daniel (verses 9-10) an account of the judgement begins with the statement that ‘thrones were set in place and one ancient in years took his seat, his robe was white as snow’ ; we are told that the opening of the books was an important part of the procedure : ‘the court sat, and the books were opened.’ Elsewhere in the same work the theme of national deliverance for Israel is combined with the idea of the resurrection of all the dead, followed by a judgement which results in the eternal bliss of the righteous and the eternal condemnation of the wicked :

*But at that moment your people will be delivered,  
every one who is written in the book :  
many of those who sleep in the dust of the earth shall wake,  
some to everlasting life  
and some to the reproach of eternal abhorrence.*

(Daniel, 12. 2.)

It is significant that several allusions to this judgement describe it in terms of weighing the actions of men. There are two clear instances in the Book of Enoch :

*And after that I saw all the secrets of the heavens, and how  
the kingdom is divided, and how the actions of men are  
weighed in the balance.*

(Enoch, 41. 1.)

*And the Lord of Spirits placed the Elect One on the throne of  
glory.  
And he shall judge all the works of the holy above in the  
heaven,  
and in the balance shall their deeds be weighed.*

(Enoch, 61. 8.)

The Book of Daniel uses the same symbol in the well-known explanation of *tekel* in *Mene tekel u-pharsin*. *Tekel* is interpreted as

*You have been weighed in the balance and found wanting.*

(Daniel, 5. 27.)

Here, it is true, we are not concerned with a universal scene of judgement ; yet the words imply a 'solemn judgement'<sup>2</sup> on the life and record of Belshazzar, whose death that very night is then reported.

At this point we confront an instructive fact. Although the balance is not mentioned in New Testament accounts of the judgement, it figures prominently in Christian art, and this evidence is a great help in tracing the continuity

of the idea of personal judgement. The vindication of Israel among the nations derives from early Hebrew thought, especially that connected with 'The Day of Yahweh'. The idea of a cosmic conflagration probably derives from Iranian thought. But the concept of the judgement of the individual has its roots elsewhere. In the early centuries of Christian art the theme is rarely treated, and in a mosaic at Ravenna<sup>3</sup> the Saviour as judge is shown accompanied by the blue angel of darkness and the bright angel of light as he directs the sheep to his right and the goats to his left. But from the twelfth century in both painting and sculpture it is the symbol of the balance that dominates the presentation.<sup>4</sup>

An example on the portal of the Cathedral of Bourges in central France shows the Saviour enthroned in a top register, whereas the central figure in the adjacent register is the archangel Michael holding the balance in his right hand. In one of the scales is a chalice, in the other a figure like a skull. Good and evil deeds are usually symbolized by the objects in the scales, but in this case the chalice suggests the idea that it is by the blood of Christ that we are saved.<sup>5</sup> In the Cathedral of Chartres one of the scales has a small figure with hands joined in prayer, whereas the other carries the skull or hideous head ; the symbolism is clearly of good and evil. The relief at Bourges shows the man who is being judged as a small nude figure behind whom stands the Devil, evidently his accuser in the trial. The judgement, then, is of one separate individual, and illustrates the Immediate or Particular Judgement, as distinguished in church doctrine by this time in opposition to the General Judgement. Yet the scene at Bourges and elsewhere envisages many as facing the trial, one by one, so that on the left a whole group of the condemned are shown being led away to hell, and a huge monster (Leviathan) is figured ahead of them. On the right are the group who have triumphed in the test ; they are proceeding in the direction of Heaven, which is suggested by the seated and canopied figure of

Abraham, in whose bosom three figures are cosily enshrouded ; it is the reference in Luke 16. 22 that lies behind this, where the beggar who died is carried by the angels ' into Abraham's bosom '.

We have noted that the weighing of souls, the *psychostasia*, or the weighing of actions, is described before this in the Hebrew literature of the first two centuries B.C. It is not expressly mentioned in the New Testament, although the idea of an individual or particular judgement is certainly part of the doctrine there conveyed. This leaves a puzzling gap of over a thousand years in the evidence for the *psychostasia* in a Christian or Jewish context. Happily it is a gap that is partly filled by statements made by some of the Church Fathers. In the fourth century, for instance, Lactantius<sup>6</sup> describes a judgement applied only to believers (for non-believers are condemned already) ; their good deeds, he says, will be weighed against their evil deeds, and if the good deeds prove more numerous and heavier, they will be assigned to a blessed life afterwards ; if the evil deeds preponderate, punishment will be inflicted on them. The theme is also touched on in Christian and Jewish writings deriving from Egypt in the early centuries. A Coptic work called *The History of Joseph the Carpenter* relates how Christ on the Mount of Olives tells his disciples that his Father will bring them to account ' with a just balance '.<sup>7</sup> A Jewish work from Egypt, which is written in Greek, *The Testament of Abraham*, mentions an angel of light ' who held a balance in his hand '.<sup>8</sup>

The mention of Egypt takes us back beyond the Book of Daniel to a religion which gave great prominence both to the idea of personal judgement and to the symbolism of the weighing of the soul (or heart as the seat of conscience). In that religion it was believed, as early as the age of the Pyramids in the third millennium B.C., that the various activities of this life would be continued in the life to come, and that among these was the possibility of litigation. It was feared that an enemy might bring an accusation

against one, and in such a situation a triumphant outcome is prayed for on the pattern of the gods who in mythology were said to have achieved victory before a divine tribunal, especially Horus and afterwards Osiris.<sup>9</sup> At the same time there are early allusions, including those in the Pyramid Texts (c. 2340—2200 B.C.) to a court in which a man's personal record is examined.<sup>10</sup> The cult of the sun-god Rê seems to be the source of this concept, and eventually it is linked with the symbolism of the balance. By the New Kingdom, after about 1400 B.C., it is given elaborate expression in both texts and pictures in Spell 125 of the Book of the Dead, copies of which on papyrus were regularly placed in tombs.

The central act of the procedure is the weighing itself ; it is well portrayed in the Papyrus of Hunefer (c. 1300 B.C.) which is now in the British Museum.<sup>11</sup> The jackal-headed god Anubis is shown leading the dead man to the scene of the weighing ; then the same god is in charge of the balance. In one of the scales is the feather of the goddess of Truth, Mâat, and she is shown also on top of the central shaft of the balance with an ostrich-feather above her head ; this feather constantly appears above the head-dress of the goddess and it symbolizes her chief attribute—truth or righteousness. In the other scale is the figure of a man's heart, regarded as the central organ of his personality<sup>12</sup> and as the abode of conscience. Now a feather is about the lightest object one can think of, and in this weighing a man's heart was thought to be weighed down by his sins ; and so, because of the basic choice of the feather as a symbol of truth, there is an odd inversion here of the concept of achieving ' full weight ' or ' full measure ' which we have noted in the Book of Daniel with its verdict ' weighed and found wanting '. The important thing here was not to depress the scale in which a man's sins counted against his heart. As an ideal result what one wished for was a perfect equilibrium and this is portrayed in the many scenes known to us. Clearly they are intended as magical auguries of a happy outcome.

In the Hebrew and Christian traditions the idea is rather that good deeds should outweigh the bad. I do not think this minor change militates against the theory of a borrowing from Egypt. Indeed it would have been surprising had the very distinctive symbolism of the feather of truth been imitated.

If we ask who made up the divine tribunal, it is apparent that many gods took part. There are forty-two divine assessors, representing the forty-two nomes of Egypt. The texts describe them also as potential executioners.<sup>13</sup> In some vignettes, as in the Papyrus of Anhai,<sup>14</sup> a priestess of the Twentieth Dynasty (c. 1150 B.C.), these assessors are shown enthroned above the scene of the trial, recalling the ' thrones ' mentioned in the Book of Daniel. Other gods taking part are Anubis, in charge of the balance, and Thoth, the god of writing, who records the result of the scrutiny. In this connection we must bear in mind that the long related text in such a papyrus contains the detailed ' Declarations of Innocence ', in which the deceased denies that he has committed various sins. For instance :

*I have not caused pain.*

*I have made no man suffer hunger.*

*I have made no one weep.*

*I have not committed murder.*

*I have not given the order for murder to be done for me.*

These, of course, are the ideal answers supplied by way of a magical precaution, but it would be wrong to assume that the real thing was not therefore the object of much heart-searching. We have evidence that a minority, at any rate, took this spiritual examination very seriously. A priest in the early third century B.C. stresses the idea that there is no class-distinction in this judgement, and that no one can escape the reckoning.<sup>15</sup> A reliance on records of deeds is assumed, and the same emphasis appears in the Hebrew and Christian concepts.

In the Papyrus of Anhai it is the god Horus who is shown leading the deceased woman to the scene of the trial. Other deities are elsewhere assigned this role. That the result of the trial can be adverse is shown by an unpleasant divine figure, the monster who is waiting to devour the guilty. In fact he is called *The Devourer* or *The Devourer of the Dead*. He is a composite creature, combining parts of a crocodile, lion and hippopotamus. The role of Leviathan in the comparable scenes from mediaeval Christian art is a clear perpetuation of this threatening monster.

Although various gods thus take part in the proceedings, texts and paintings make it clear that the presiding judge is normally regarded as Osiris. In a papyrus belonging to a female musician of the god Amûn at Deir el-Bahari (Twenty-first Dynasty, c. 1000 B.C., now in the Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York) Osiris on his throne overlooks the process of weighing.<sup>16</sup> This painting seems to indicate rather favoured treatment, for the singer is introduced by Isis, the wife and sister of Osiris the judge ; Thoth the Recorder is missing, and the monster is missing too. It is the ordering of the gods that recalls the Christian scenes of judgement : just as Osiris is here the presiding judge although other deities actually conduct the proceedings, so in Christian art is the Saviour shown enthroned above although it is Michael the archangel who manages the weighing.

It is to Osiris that Thoth is shown carrying the scroll in a papyrus which is now in Manchester (of the second or first century B.C.).<sup>17</sup> Everything, then, has now been recorded and registered, an action which was almost an obsession with the ancient Egyptians ;<sup>18</sup> their modern descendants, as anyone who has visited Egypt will know, have continued the tradition ; they have several endearing qualities, but they still insist that everything must be recorded and registered. We recall that a Recording Angel figures in the judgement scene in Bourges Cathedral.

Again, after a favourable verdict has been achieved, it

is to Osiris that the deceased is presented.<sup>19</sup> Occasionally the sun-god Rê is shown as the presiding god,<sup>20</sup> a reminder of the fact that the *psychostasia* originated with him.

The persistence of the belief in Egypt is well illustrated by a painting on linen which is hitherto unpublished and which belongs to the newly acquired Swansea Wellcome Collection now housed in the College. It dates from the Graeco-Roman era and in style is somewhat debased. What is instructive is that the deceased lady whose heart is here being weighed is dressed in the Greek mode, a clear pointer to the spread of the belief among the Greeks in Egypt.<sup>21</sup> During this era the Egyptian cults were also becoming popular in many of the Mediterranean lands, and the concept of judgement, if not an exactly popular ingredient, was doubtless spread in this process.

It is true that the symbolism of the *psychostasia* occurs in other religions. In his book *The Judgment of the Dead* (London, 1967) S. G. F. Brandon shows that it occurs in later Judaism and Christianity, and also in Islam; these are developments which are interconnected. It occurs in Mycenaean and early Greek tradition. In Iranian religion its earliest occurrence is hard to date, and it is overshadowed by the symbol of the Bridge in connection with judgement. In Hinduism and Buddhism it does not figure in the early strata of the evidence. What is clear is that Egypt is the only region where the tradition was strong before the first millennium B.C.

If the impact made on other religions is beyond question, some details have still to be elucidated, and there are a few problems too in the development of the Egyptian concept. One concerns the form of the trial. The Egyptians, as we have noted, believed that litigation was possible after death, and that a tribunal would examine a man's personal record. But why should the tribunal take the form of weighing his heart against the feather of truth? An act of weighing anything in public could scarcely have been a normal procedure in a court of law; occasionally, perhaps, if a question of false weights

and measures arose, one could envisage this kind of thing happening. The balance depicted in these scenes is naturally very similar to those in daily use, as can be observed from an episode of weighing gold depicted in the tomb of Nebamûn and Ipuky in Thebes (late Eighteenth Dynasty, c. 1300 B.C.).<sup>22</sup> Here the gold is shown in round ingots and the weight has the shape of a bull's head. What is interesting is that a figure of the goddess of truth, Mâat, appears above the balance. This shows how wrong it would be to apply a division of sacred and secular to Egyptian life; it also indicates that the impartiality of a balance was linked with the idea of truth as incorporated in the goddess. Early texts ascribe the just balance to the sun-god as an instrument of his exact assessments. Symbolism is therefore involved, but it has a divine association. The idea of litigation is still present in the weighing process of posthumous judgement, for a man's heart is regarded as his potential accuser before the gods.<sup>23</sup>

Another problem in the concept is the tremendous importance attached to the fate of each separate individual. The same applies to the Jewish and Christian version, although the emphasis is there sometimes blurred by the concurrent idea that nations are being judged. In the background of Ancient Egypt it may seem surprising that the assessment of every person, whatever his rank or origin, is thus stressed, for society there was normally marked by a rigid degree of centralization.<sup>24</sup> There is a warning here against any simple process of finding a reflex of society in religion. It is true that the whole idea probably started with the King, but its application to the dead in general, a process often referred to as 'democratization', finds no parallel in the political ordering of society, although some have argued that the period of anarchy and disruption at the end of the Old Kingdom may have encouraged the spiritual claims of the individual.

After the judgement came the reward or punishment, both of which are amply described and illustrated in



Egyptian sources. Punishment is symbolized by the waiting monster, or by an abyss of fire. The reward may be in heaven with the sun-god, and the bliss of the celestial afterworld is often portrayed in early texts. At other times the scene is the Nile Valley in an idealized form and the dead are depicted enjoying a heightened version of the delights of the present life. A good instance is seen in a painting on a tomb wall in Deir el-Medina in Western Thebes (Twentieth Dynasty, c. 1880 B.C.) where a man called Sen-Nedjem is shown with his wife in the Fields of Iaru.<sup>25</sup> The scene is intersected by branches of the Nile, suggesting islands. There are fruitful trees and scenes which show Sen-Nedjem and his wife ploughing, sowing and reaping. In the top register they greet a barque in which the sun-god and Osiris are figured. These Isles or Fields of the Blest are part of a supremely happy concept of immortality, and the whole picture contrasts sharply with the traditional Greek view of the afterworld. According to this view a man's soul, when separated from the body, passes into Hades, and its existence there is gloomy and shadowy, a life without full consciousness even, rather like the Hebrew idea of Sheol, which borders on annihilation.

Now there intrudes into Greek religion at times a quite different idea, that of Elysium, and in many ways it is similar to the Egyptian view of a radiantly happy afterworld. I have long since argued,<sup>26</sup> following the Swedish scholar Martin Nilsson, that the Greeks derived this more cheerful view from Crete and Mycenae, and that it was from Egypt that it came to Crete. The Egyptian paradise was, however, conditional on one's justification in the tribunal after death, and it is natural to ask whether the Greek view of Elysium or its prototype included the element of judgement. There is only one allusion to Elysium in Homer, and that is in a promise made by the 'deathless Egyptian Proteus' to Menelaus. He is told that he is not fated to die in Argos, but that a happier lot awaits him :

*But to the Elysian plain and the world's end  
Will the immortal gods take you,  
Where dwells fair-haired Rhadamanthus,  
Where life is most pleasant to men.*

(*Od.* 4. 563-5.)

An idyllic picture follows :

*No snow is there, nor mighty storm, nor any rain—*

a good description of the Nile Valley, by the way, although Lower Egypt has occasional wintry showers. Everything seems to be fine in this garden of the gods until we remember that 'fair-haired Rhadamanthus' is in fact the judge of the dead, as Pindar and other authors tell us. It is true that Menelaus is promised a special dispensation by which he will avoid death. But the conspicuous place given to Rhadamanthus recalls the Egyptian doctrine that paradise and judgement are after all connected. The god Osiris too is both the judge of the dead and the bestower of paradise. His abode in Abydos is sometimes called 'The Isle of the Just'.

If we look for parallel archaeological evidence relating to the Minoan-Mycenaean religion, we confront the golden butterflies of Mycenae. They were discovered in the Third Shaft Grave by Schliemann himself, who was understandably thrilled by the unearthing of so much gold. In fact the golden butterflies of Mycenae are a good test-case in archaeological interpretation, and the original excavator, amateur though he was, comes creditably out of the difficulties posed. These butterflies are embossed on gold disks and attached by means of perforation through the upper ends to small chains. In their wings they have eyes, and what is instructive from our present point of view is that they form parts of golden scales. The beams of these scales consist of tubes of thin gold plate, which are attached to the scales by long, thin straps of gold. One pair of scales has a

floral decoration, while the other represents butterflies which have large, tapering bodies and wings divided symmetrically.<sup>27</sup> Schliemann<sup>28</sup> did not hesitate to posit a symbolical meaning, stressing that the objects were found in a grave. He refers vaguely and briefly to wall-paintings in Egyptian tombs, 'in which are weighed the good and bad deeds of the deceased' (this is not quite correct) but prefers to cite in analogy the *psychostasia* as it occurs in Homer (*II.* 22. 209-13 ; cf. 8. 69ff.), where scales are said to be used by Zeus to weigh the fates of Hector and Achilles. In these scales were placed 'the two lots of death, the prostrator'. The result is that 'down sank Hector's day of doom, and fell to Hades.' What is most attractive, perhaps, in the analogy is that Homer describes them as 'golden scales', exactly fitting the Mycenaean find.

The interpretation was supported by Sir Arthur Evans, who explained the butterflies as symbolical of the soul and compared their presence, with a chrysalis (twice), on a large gold signet-ring, the so-called 'Ring of Nestor' which was found at Kakovatos, north of Pylos. While the authenticity of this object has been questioned, it may be a copy of an ancient original. Arthur Evans offered a plausible explanation of the grouping of butterfly and chrysalis : the one denoted the soul, the other new life after death. We are reminded by him that the Greeks sometimes used the word *psyché*, 'soul', to mean 'a butterfly'. Aristotle (*Hist. An.* 551<sup>a</sup>14) does this in a passage where he describes the development of the butterfly from caterpillar and chrysalis. Again, works of art which illustrate the legend of Cupid and Psyche show Psyche with the wings of a butterfly.

In such parallels we are jumping about two thousand years—perhaps I should say flying or butterflying—ahead of the objects involved. Some have firmly rejected any symbolical interpretation of the golden scales from Mycenae, arguing that they 'are simply to be looked upon as a gift just as necessary to the housewife in her grave

as sword and drinking-cup are to the man in his.'<sup>29</sup> (The grave belongs to three women and two infants.) The trouble here is that the scales are so very small and fragile ; they could have been of no earthly use in a domestic sense.<sup>30</sup> Perhaps the argument could be sustained by seeing them as diminutive models.<sup>31</sup> Other occurrences in mainland and Cretan tombs concern balances mostly of bronze which are not equipped with butterflies, and in their case it is hard to press a symbolical meaning.<sup>32</sup>

In such a situation what favours an affinity with Egypt is the time-factor : the Egyptian *psychostasia* was at the height of its influence in the second half of the second millennium B.C., which is the period involved. On the other hand, while the Egyptian tradition was heavily symbolic, no identity of symbolism can be maintained. It is true that a form of the soul, the *ba*, is often represented in Egypt as a human-headed bird, and sometimes a man's *ba* is depicted above the scene of the weighing of the heart ; it is shown, for instance, in the Papyrus of Ani above the scale in which the heart appears. Still, the *ba*-bird is not quite a butterfly, and what is also puzzling in the golden scales of Mycenae is that a butterfly appears in both the scales. Clearly, if there is a reflection of the Egyptian idea, there must in this case be some new application of it. Perhaps the identity of the scales implies that the soul is shown in two aspects, the good and the bad.

Schliemann was possibly right in looking forward to Homer, where the two scales hold similar, if not identical, figures. They are the figures of warriors engaged in mortal combat. The presiding god is always Zeus, and we are told that he uses his golden scales to compare the impending fates or death-daemons (*kéres*) of the Trojan and Greek armies (*II.* 8. 69 ff.) ; the result is that 'down sank the Greeks' day of doom', whereas the fate of the Trojans was lifted up towards heaven. This is not, of course, the final verdict, and the passage may well be a weak doublet of the account of the weighing which

concerns Hector and Achilles (*Il.* 22. 209 ff.) and to which we have already referred. There are some obvious differences from the Egyptian tradition. The Homeric weighing has no ethical content at all; it is concerned simply with the fate of the heroes who are fighting one against the other. One is to die; the other will live. Again, it has to do with this world, not the next. In a sense, of course, the Egyptian idea involves one's fate—the ultimate fate after death, and a triumph in the tribunal will avoid the experience of the 'second death', an Egyptian phrase which occurs also in the Book of Revelation. As for the relationship between Zeus and the fate of men, it would probably be wrong to interpret his resort to the scales as implying that he himself is ruled by fate.<sup>33</sup> The balance is rather his instrument of expressing his will. On the other hand, it is hard to believe that the weighing is introduced merely to heighten the dramatic effect. It is much more likely to derive from religious belief and imagery.

In spite of the differences of content which we have mentioned, there are formal resemblances that recall the Egyptian tradition. In Homer the scale which proves the heavier bears the unfortunate loser, and this rather strange feature is found too in the Egyptian pattern, as we have already observed. When Vergil describes (*Aeneid*, 12. 725) the fates of Aeneas and Turnus being weighed, he is of course following Homer and reproduces the same Egyptian detail, for the scale that sinks denotes death. Homer is followed too by Milton in *Paradise Lost* (4, 996 ff.)<sup>34</sup> when he describes 'Th' Eternal' hanging forth 'his golden scales', with the result that Satan's scale 'kicked the beam', indicating that he was

*weighed and shown how light, how weak.*

It is perhaps typical of Milton that he begins the episode with a Homeric touch, but continues with an impress of the Book of Daniel.

In one place (*Il.* 16. 658) Homer says that Hector knew the 'scales of Zeus', that is, he sensed how fate was working, and upon the death of Sarpedon, he therefore fled. Mention is made elsewhere (*Il.* 19. 223) of how Zeus, the 'disposer of wars', 'inclines the scales'. Yet this makes a total of only four allusions in Homer to this idea. By way of contrast the relevant representations in Greek art are fairly numerous. They are mostly vase-paintings, and on a jar which is now in Paris<sup>35</sup> the weighing is depicted as being conducted by the god Hermes. In the scales are two small figures of armed warriors, perhaps Achilles and Hector, as Homer has described. On the right a woman is looking on rather excitedly; we cannot be sure who she is, but she must presumably be a goddess. On the left, surveying the ceremony, is the god Zeus, holding his sceptre and thunderbolt. In Homer it is Zeus himself who is said to hold the balance, but here the disposition of the gods distinctly recalls the Egyptian order. Zeus corresponds in function to the presiding judge Osiris, whereas Hermes has the role assigned in Egypt to Anubis and Thoth.

A feature of the Greek vase-paintings is that the most popular subject is the weighing of the figures of Achilles and Memnon, a theme that points to the direction of Egypt, for Memnon was the King of the Ethiopians. Indeed a later Alexandrian tradition regarded him as an Egyptian. Memnon's mother was said to be Eos, goddess of the dawn, and in some of the scenes which depict the warrior-souls of Achilles and Memnon being weighed, Eos is shown in a pleading posture. Perhaps she is the goddess on the jar in Paris. According to a piece of an epic now largely lost, the *Aethiopsis*, she is imploring Zeus to confer immortality on her son.<sup>36</sup> This lost epic was probably earlier than Homer, and it seems to have provided the theme of a play by Aeschylus, which is also lost, but which bore the significant title *Psychostasia*. What has not been hitherto noticed<sup>37</sup> is that if Eos is pleading for the grant of immortality to her son, then the theme of the *psychostasia*

is much nearer to that of the Egyptian tradition because it is now concerned with life after death. However, the mother of Achilles, Thetis, is sometimes depicted as well, and in such a case the mothers must clearly be pleading for the victory which means life in this world.

Certainly immortality is not usually the theme in this type of judgement either in Homer or in the vase-paintings. An ethical stress is also absent, and there is a further difference: whereas in Egypt the judgement awaits everyone, in the early Greek tradition it involves only a few select heroes. The distinctive symbolism is what points to Egypt as the source, but it seems that the form rather than the content was borrowed. We are tempted to agree with the German scholar (Ernst Wüst) who suggests that it was the pictorial element that lay behind the borrowing, and that once the basic image was taken over, a new interpretation was supplied. Needless to say, such a phenomenon is not at all unusual in the history of religions, and a good example is found in another point of contact between Greece and Egypt. I am referring to the belief in the transmigration of souls or metempsychosis, which according to Herodotus (2. 123) was derived by the Greeks from Egyptian religion. Such a belief does not seem to be present in that religion, but the pictorial representation of a rather similar idea may well have been interpreted as implying metempsychosis. I have in mind the common scenes in which the soul, as the *ba*-bird, is shown leaving the body.<sup>38</sup>

In view of the partial nature of the early borrowing, it may seem surprising that at a later stage Greek religion developed a fully-fledged eschatology which included not only judgement after death, but also the doctrine of heaven and hell. The beginnings of the system are present already in Minoan religion, which has borrowed from Egypt the concept of the 'Isles of the Blest'. In the archaeological record it is the sarcophagus from Haghia Triada in southern Crete that provides the clearest evidence for this borrowing. It is not, however, an

isolated testimony, since the Egyptian boat of the dead, which is there depicted, is probably to be recognized in four other representations on rings.<sup>39</sup> Nor should it be forgotten that Egyptian influence on Crete in other ways, especially in religious symbols and artistic motifs, is well attested.

If a Heaven was thus provided, the Greeks of a later age proceeded to elaborate its counterpart: Hades was transmuted into a Hell. Not only that: the system which we know as the Orphic system made Heaven and Hell completely dependent on moral justification or the absence of it, and this again is a true reflection of the Egyptian tradition. The non-Greek intrusion begins as early as Homer. In the Eleventh Book of the *Odyssey* Odysseus visits Hades and his encounter there with the spirits of the dead, including that of Achilles, conforms with the picture of Hades as a place where all are reduced to a common state of gloomy semi-existence. And yet another confrontation betrays a severe process of division among the spirits of the dead, for Odysseus sees Minos, 'the radiant son of Zeus,' enthroned and holding a golden sceptre. He is dealing out judgement to the dead. (*Od.* 11. 568-71). Minos was, of course, the most celebrated king of Crete, according to tradition. He is said to be the brother of Rhadamanthus who is also, as we have seen, regarded as a judge of the dead. The passage in the *Odyssey* goes on to describe the punishment of three particular sinners: Tityus is being gnawed by vultures, Tantalus is tormented by water and fruit which he cannot reach, and Sisyphus is rolling a big stone up a hill only to find that it constantly comes down again. All this is very different from Homer's normal approach to life after death. Nowhere else does he suggest a doctrine of posthumous punishment, although in one passage, as we have noted earlier, he does describe the Elysium which is the reward of a happy and just *élite*.

It is not surprising that many scholars regard the account of the judgement in the *Odyssey* as a later inter-

polation derived from Orphic sources. What is odd is that a similar suggestion is not usually made about the description of Elysium. Clearly the one passage is the counterpart of the other : the one depicts the punishment of the wicked, the other the reward of the just. There is no need to postulate a later interpolation in either case. Whereas the two passages run counter to the Greek idea of Hades, which Homer normally presents, they both have the stamp of a Cretan origin, and beyond that the impress of Egyptian ideas of Heaven and Hell. One development which differs from the Egyptian prototype is that the ideas apply only to a select few, and not to men in general. Yet even here the situation corresponds to the early stage of the Egyptian doctrine.

In the Greek thought of the classical age it is Plato who gives the most elaborate expression to this idea. At the end of the *Republic*, for instance, the myth of Er tells how the souls of the dead are subject to a judgement which is based on a scrutiny of their lives. For each misdeed a tenfold penalty is exacted, and a similar scale is applied to rewards. The examination is related to records which the souls carry with them, a detail which recalls the Book of the Dead in Egypt. Plato here refers to judges in the plural, but he does not name them. In the *Apology* (41 A) and elsewhere he does name them, and prominent among them are Minos and Rhadamanthus, a clear sign that we are dealing with the same tradition. There are many diverse elements, admittedly, in the Orphic amalgam of ideas to which Plato was attracted, but the concept of judgement was probably of Minoan, and ultimately Egyptian, origin. The same ultimate origin has been claimed for another element of Orphic teaching. According to the Orphic writings the world took its beginning from a huge primeval egg which was fertilized by the wind ; and it has been recently shown that this idea is found in Egypt, although it occurs also in the Iranian tradition.<sup>40</sup>

Plato's presentation of the process of judgement is

very similar to that conveyed in the Sixth Book of Vergil's *Aeneid*. While the Greek author uses prose as his medium, his account has a poetic radiance about it ; and Vergil's poetry is acknowledged to be at its best in this book of the *Aeneid*. To some extent Vergil is following Homer, for he describes in some detail the penalties inflicted on prominent wrongdoers. In spite of this detail he makes it quite clear, as Plato also does, that the judgement concerns everyone, and this is true of the developed pattern transmitted from Egypt. Vergil tells us that the judge is Rhadamanthus of Knosos (566), who wields pitiless power (*habet durissima regna*), compelling everyone to confess the sins which he left unatoned in the world above. Elsewhere (432) Minos is named as a judge.

Like Plato, Vergil enounces the doctrine of the Two Ways. The Sibyl tells Aeneas, when they have reached a certain place in the underworld, that two paths lie ahead :

*It is here that the way splits into two paths ; one track, on the right, goes straight to mighty Pluto's battlements and by it we make our journey to Elysium ; and the other, to the left, brings evil men to godless Tartarus, and, with never a pause, exacts their punishment.*

(*Aen.* 6. 540-3, tr. W. F. J. Knight.)

Similarly in Plato's *Republic* (614 C), when judgement has been given, the just are ordered to take the path to the right, which leads to heaven, while the unjust are bidden to take the path to the left, which leads below. Orphic writings inscribed on pieces of gold leaf which derive from the Greek cities of Southern Italy (probably fourth century B.C. in date) show a similar emphasis : the way to the left in the House of Hades is inauspicious, but the deified dead is exhorted to ' proceed on the path to the right to the sacred meadows and groves of Persephone '.<sup>41</sup> Both allusions imply a sequel of judgement, and it has been shown that in Egyptian texts the justified dead are

similarly committed to the path on the right, which is equated with the bliss of the West, whereas the damned are sent to the left.<sup>42</sup> Precisely the same allocation is found in the Gospel of Matthew (25. 33) and it often figures in depictions of judgement in mediaeval Christian art.

It is idle to pretend that we can trace every step in the transmission of the Egyptian concept of judgement. Its presence in Palestine in the Hellenistic and Roman eras is amply attested in Hebrew literature. In the case of the Greek Orphic writings the influence of Pythagoras is acknowledged, and scholars are no longer so sceptical about the late tradition that he spent many years in Egypt.<sup>43</sup> But the influence of Minoan religion is the more likely intermediary. Whether the Greek Mysteries of Eleusis included an episode or doctrine of judgement is hard to know. In a play concerned mainly with literary criticism, *The Frogs* of Aristophanes, the Eleusinian background is stressed by the fact that the chorus itself consists of initiates. Further, the culminating act of the literary judgement is the weighing in a balance of the merits of Aeschylus and Euripides. Can we infer from this that such a symbolism occurred in the Mysteries themselves, but with reference to the fate of the soul? The inference is a tempting one, but seems not to be supported by other evidence.

From the third century onwards the Egyptian cult of Isis and of the gods associated with her was spreading to the Greek world. By the early part of the first century it was making an appeal to a section of the population of Rome and Campania. Here too there were Epicurean schools, and to one or more of these the Latin poet Lucretius may have belonged. In his passionate presentation of Epicurean doctrine Lucretius often condemns the fear of death, and especially the fear of punishment after death. The poet must have known what was going on in the minds of his contemporaries, and his attack on the doctrine of judgement and punish-

ment after death must surely relate to his experience of the religion of his day. It is true that Mr. E. J. Kenny classifies Lucretius as a 'lone wolf'. In some ways every artist is a 'lone wolf', occasionally even a *Steppenwolf*. Yet, however isolated he was, Lucretius very probably met other Epicureans in Rome or Campania; his intense devotion to the doctrine and his mastery of it could scarcely have emerged without some contact with others of the same interest. Followers of Isis, on the other hand, would not have attracted him, but he could hardly fail to notice them and to become familiar with some of their views. Indeed it has recently been argued with some cogency that the 'Invocation to Venus' with which he begins his great poem is coloured by the contemporary interpretation of Isis as Panthea, a goddess who incorporated all divine power.<sup>44</sup>

Now the possibility of punishment after death was taught by the religion of Isis. It was conspicuously absent from Roman religion, for the *Manes*, the spirits of the dead, were envisaged as a collective entity which excluded individual survival. Lucretius (3. 1014 ff.) refers to the punishments inflicted on wrongdoers during their lives, but goes on to suggest that the fear is being compellingly projected to the life after death. He refers also to the Greek stories of the penalties suffered by notable sinners, Tantalus, Tityus and the rest: these stories, he urges, are just allegories of the torments suffered by men here and now, in their own lives. Here he is anticipating trends which became fashionable in much later theology. It is worth noting that Cicero<sup>45</sup> too did not take these myths seriously; they are 'the gloomy fantasies of poets and painters'.

The intense feeling with which Lucretius pursues this theme can scarcely be explained against the background of Greek mythology. Another possible source is Etruscan religion, which certainly produces gloomy and monstrous figures in a funerary setting, although we cannot be sure whether a doctrine of judgement was involved. In his

Commentary on Lucretius, Cyril Bailey (II, 994 f.) examines the Greek and Etruscan possibilities, but admits that the evidence on either side is 'slight and not fully convincing'. Etruscan religion was certainly a spent force by this time, whereas the cult of Isis was gaining influence in Rome and Pompeii. In the attitude of followers of that cult Lucretius would have seen that the fear of punishment after death could be a living reality. When the poet talks (3. 1012) of the jaws of hell emitting noxious vapours, he is clearly envisaging Tartarus as a monster. It is true that Vergil (*Aen.* 6. 240) uses a similar expression about the cave of Avernus. But in a context of penalty and punishment one might recall the Egyptian monster whose crocodile jaws await the damned. Admittedly the Etruscans can produce a candidate, but one doubts whether interest in such depictions was anything more, in the time of Lucretius, than an antiquarian pleasure. A contemporary of the poet, Diodorus Siculus (I. 92. 1 ff.), provides evidence of the continued belief in the judgement. He is describing religion in Egypt and he gives the tradition a quite unexpected twist. According to him the judgement is carried out, not by the gods, but by living persons, who allow any one to bring an accusation against the dead man. Only if the verdict is favourable is an honourable burial allowed. It is hard to accept his version as it stands, but at least it attests the vitality of the concept.

It may seem that some of the suggestions I have made are rather bold, affecting as they do the interpretation of one area in Judaism and Christianity, the religions of the Minoans and Mycenaeans, as well as early Greek and Orphic traditions.

It would be a good idea to consider possible obstacles to the theory. One may arise from a personal consideration, and this can influence research in many fields. It is what the Germans call *Fach-Chauvinismus*, and in the present case it might mean that because I am an Egyptologist, I am too easily led to believe that Egyptian influence was

potent in large areas outside Egypt. After pondering this *caveat* I am convinced that no other ancient tradition could have produced the impact sufficient to spread the doctrine of judgement.<sup>46</sup> On the other hand, the danger I have mentioned may affect other interpreters. It is noticeable, for instance, that whereas historians of art have long since recognized the Egyptian pattern in the mediaeval Christian judgement scenes, it is very rare to find mention of that pattern in a Bible commentary. One suspects that occasionally the idea is present that it would be a little degrading to acknowledge the debt of the Christian tradition to non-Christian religions, although Paul himself, who was a 'Hebrew born and bred' (Phil. 3. 5), once said that he was 'under obligation to Greek and non-Greek' (Rom. 1. 14). More often, I think, the reason for the failure is simply the lack of contact between different disciplines.

There is certainly no historical obstacle involving an impossibility of contact. There was a time when a diffusionist theory associated with the names of Elliot Smith and W. J. Perry claimed that civilisation everywhere had its origins in Egypt. No one today seems to take that idea seriously, although the voyages of Thor Heyerdahl in a papyrus-boat from Morocco to South America seem to betray a hankering after it. Why he used a papyrus-boat remains a mystery, for the Egyptians had stout sea-going ships of wood. More recently a theory has been propounded that petroglyphs found in the Islands of Hawaii resemble Egyptian hieroglyphs, and that, in spite of the vast distance involved, there must have been colonization from Egypt. I mention these hypotheses in order to point a contrast. The zone of influence posited in our discussion has been mainly the Eastern Mediterranean, especially Crete, Greece, and Palestine. These are areas where contact and commerce with Egypt is well established from the second millennium B.C., and in some cases even earlier.

As for the process and development of the influence, a

certain variety is apparent. The general idea may be borrowed, but its application may be different. This is clearly true of the Homeric concept of judgement: although a weighing of souls or fates is described, it is applied to man's destiny in this world. The kind of change of emphasis which is possible within a fairly firmly established tradition is illustrated by a depiction of the Last Judgement in a monastery at Dečani in Yugoslavia.<sup>47</sup> The scene follows the usual pattern, but the archangel Michael is shown intervening on behalf of the 'good' scale, whereas the Devil is anxiously trying to depress the 'bad' scale. In this kind of depiction—and there are others like it—the original idea of a scrupulously impartial weighing of the soul has been abandoned in favour of a contest between the protagonists of good and evil.

In general one has to distinguish between form and content. The Egyptian symbolism of judgement made a wide appeal, and its pictorial power was doubtless a potent element. In the textual record a doctrine of the deletion of sin is developed; although the balance is impartial, one's identification with Osiris means that acquittal is secured by analogy. There is a similar dualism in the developed Christian teaching, but with a content that is spiritually much richer: if the judgement is inexorable, yet the Saviour who judges is also the believer's advocate, and his forgiveness is the deciding factor.

## NOTES

- 1 D. R. Griffiths in *Cerddi Cadwgan* (Swansea, 1953), 38.
- 2 Norman W. Porteous, *Daniel: A Commentary* (London, 1965), 82.
- 3 The Church of S. Apollinare Nuovo. See F. W. Deichmann, *Ravenna: Geschichte und Monumente* (Wiesbaden, 1969), Farbtafel A 2 and pp. 180-81.
- 4 For a survey of this material see S. G. F. Brandon, *The Judgment of the Dead* (London, 1967), 118 ff.
- 5 Emile Mâle, *L'art religieux du XIII<sup>e</sup> siècle en France* (8th ed., Paris, 1948), 382. For a good reproduction of the whole scene see his *Religious Art from the Twelfth to the Eighteenth Century* (London, 1949), p. 22. Jean Fournée, *Le Jugement Dernier* (Paris, 1964) studies many parallel scenes.
- 6 *Divinae Institutiones*, 7 ('De vita beata'). 20. 6 (ed. S. Brandt and G. Laubmann, Vienna, 1890, p. 649).
- 7 P. de Lagarde, *Aegyptiaca* (1883), 2; Siegfried Morenz, *Die Geschichte von Joseph dem Zimmermann* (Berlin, 1951), 2 (I, 6) and 35. The text is found also in Latin and Arabic.
- 8 M. R. James, *The Testament of Abraham* (Texts and Studies, II, 2, Cambridge, 1892), ch. 12 of Greek text (p. 91) and pp. 70 ff. Cf. Mathias Delcor, *Le Testament d'Abraham* (Studia in Veteris Testamenti Pseudepigrapha, 2, Leiden, 1973). 39 ff. M. Delcor dates the work to the first century A.D.
- 9 For a study of these ideas see my *Conflict of Horus and Seth* (Liverpool, 1960), ch. 3, pp. 54-84.
- 10 See R. Grieshammer, *Das Jenseitsgericht in den Sargtexten* (Wiesbaden, 1970) and my review in the *Journal of Egyptian Archaeology* 57 (1971), 211.
- 11 G. Posener, *A Dictionary of Egyptian Civilization* (London, 1962), 298.
- 12 J. Spiegel, *Die Idee vom Totengericht in der ägyptischen Religion* (Leipzig, 1935), 64.
- 13 According to Yoyotte, *Le Jugement des morts* (Paris, 1961), 59, they are executioners who massacre the guilty and drink their blood.
- 14 R. Patrick, *All Colour Book of Egyptian Mythology* (London, 1972), 64, pl. 88.
- 15 Petosiris: see E. Otto, *Die biographischen Inschriften der ägyptischen Spätzeit* (Leiden, 1954), 51 f. and 181.



16 Irmgard Woldering (tr. Ann E. Keep), *Egypt: the Art of the Pharaohs* (Art of the World, 12; London, 1963), 93, pl. 16. The caption wrongly states that the weighing takes place in the absence of the deceased; it is the translation that is at fault.

17 Brandon, op. cit. 47, fig. 4.

18 Cf. J. Spiegel, op. cit., 5 n. 2.

19 Cf. E. A. Wallis Budge, *The Dwellers on the Nile* (London, 1926), 233 (Papyrus of Ani).

20 See the example on a painted funerary casket of the Twenty-Sixth Dynasty, where Rê-Herakhty, a form of the sun-god, presides. It is reproduced in V. Ions, *Egyptian Mythology* (Feltham, 1965), 108.

21 I am indebted to my wife, Dr. Kate Bosse Griffiths, Honorary Curator of the Collection, for drawing my attention to this painting and for her comments on many other points.

22 G. Posener, op. cit., 140.

23 Cf. R. Grieshammer, op. cit. 52 ff.; J. Gwyn Griffiths, op. cit. 79 f.

24 Walther Wolf, *Individuum und Gemeinschaft in der ägyptischen Kultur* (Glückstadt, 1935), 18 ff., argues that the identification of the deceased with Osiris robbed the trial of any moral validity, and that the absence of confession and repentance points to a lack of individual consciousness. His argument is based entirely on Spell 125 of the Book of the Dead, which is admittedly magical in intent. Behind that there was probably a real concern about the tribunal's verdict, and the texts assembled by Spiegel and Yoyotte prove this at least for a minority of thoughtful people.

25 Eberhard Otto (tr. Kate Bosse Griffiths), *Egyptian Art: The Cults of Osiris and Amon* (London, 1967), pl. XV.

26 'In Search of the Isles of the Blest', *Greece and Rome* 16 (1947), 122-6. For a different view see C. Froidefond, *Le Mirage égyptien dans la littérature grecque* (Aix-en-Provence, 1971), 40 f.

27 Sir Arthur Evans in *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 45 (1925), 55, fig. 47; 56, fig. 48; and *The Palace of Minos*, III (London, 1930), 150 ff. Cf. also A. J. B. Wace, *Chamber Tombs at Mycenae* (Oxford, 1932), 37 and 173 f. (with the refs. to Tell el-Amarna).

28 *Mycenae* (London, 1878), 197, figs. 301-2.

29 C. Schuchardt, *Schliemann's Excavations* (London, 1891), 206.

30 Cf. Charles Picard, *Les Religions préhelléniques (Crète et Mycènes)* (Paris, 1948), 290, where the connection with the Egyptian *psychostasia* is accepted.

31 So M. P. Nilsson, *The Minoan-Mycenaean Religion etc.* (2nd ed., Lund, 1950), 47, citing the view of Svoronos that a balance for the weighing of gold is intended. Ernst Wüst in *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft* 36 (1939), 162-71, takes the view that while the Greek *psychostasia* in general derives from Egypt, the Mycenaean balances are unconnected with the theme.

32 C. Picard, loc. cit. Cf. A. W. Persson, *New Tombs at Dendra near Midea* (Lund, 1942), 73 f.

33 Cf. B. C. Dietrich, *Death, Fate and the Gods* (London, 1965), 294 ff.

34 Cf. T. E. Page *ad Vergil, Aeneid*, 12. 727.

35 Brandon, op. cit. 79, fig. 5; Ernst Wüst, op. cit. 164, no. 3.

36 G. Kinkel, *Epic. Graec. Fr.* (1877), I, 33. According to Plutarch, *De aud. poet.* 2, 17 A, Thetis, the mother of Achilles, and Eos, the mother of Memnon, are both pleading for their sons who are fighting.

37 Not even by Ernst Wüst, who has well elucidated the Egyptian affinities of this theme.

38 Cf. my remarks in the *Journal of Near Eastern Studies* 25 (1966), 61; also the study by Louis V. Zabkar, *ibid.* 22 (1963), 57-63. My colleague, Dr. Alan B. Lloyd is about to publish a new commentary on Herodotus Book II (from the house of Brill in Leiden).

39 A. W. Persson, *The Religion of Greece in Prehistoric Times*, 84, ring 28; also rings 25, 26, 27. The boats, as Persson points out, recall that of the Egyptian sun-god (Rê), but he misleads when he claims 'a close connection of Osiris with the sun', unless he is thinking of the fact that the Osirian dead is allowed to voyage with the Rê in his boat.

40 See S. Morenz, 'Ägypten und die altorphanische Kosmogonie' in *Aus Antike und Orient: Festschrift Wilhelm Schubart* (Leipzig, 1950), 64-111; cf. my *Plutarch's De Iside et Osiride* (Cardiff, 1970), 478; and Martin L. West in *The Sixth International Congress of Classical Studies: Summaries of Reports* (Madrid, 1974), 37.


41 G. Zuntz, *Persephone* (Oxford, 1971), 328 ff. and 358 ff.

42 S. Morenz, 'Rechts und links im Totengericht', *Zeitschrift für ägyptische Sprache und Altertumskunde* 82 (1957), 62-71. G. Zuntz, op. cit. 376 n. 1, although he recognizes other Egyptian analogies in the inscriptions from South Italy, is strangely obtuse to the importance of this point. See also M. L. West, *Early Greek Philosophy and the Orient* (Oxford, 1971), 65 f.

43 G. Zuntz, op. cit. 392, citing Kurt von Fritz.

44 P. F. Tschudin, *Isis in Rom* (Aarau, 1962), 15 and 44 f.

45 *Tusc. Disp.* I. 10-11.



46 Babylonian texts refer to judges in the underworld, as Professor W. G. Lambert has reminded me. The idea does not appear, however, to have been very explicitly developed. See Erich Ebeling, *Tod und Leben nach den Vorstellungen der Babylonier* (Berlin, 1931), 21 (an Accadian text from Susa in Elam, of the sixth or seventh century B.C.) ; cf. Brandon, op. cit. 53. Some of Ebeling's interpretations have been questioned ; see Jeanne-Marie Aynard in *Le Jugement desmorts*, 97 ff. See also Morris Jastrow, Jr., *Aspects of Religious Belief and Practice in Babylonia and Assyria* (1911, repr. New York, 1971), 363 ; S. H. Hooke, *Babylonian and Assyrian Religion* (London, 1953), 100 ('. . . the Babylonian conception of divine retribution for sin and reward for righteousness was entirely confined to this life . . .') ; H. W. F. Saggs, *Everyday Life in Babylonia and Assyria* (London, 1965), 198.

47 Desanka Milosevic, *The Last Judgment* (tr. G. H. Genzel and H. Rosenwald. Pictorial Library of Eastern Church Art, 3, Vaduz, 1964), opposite p. 54.



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